This article first appeared in the SiC Report “The Global South in an Era of Great Power Competition. Click here to access the introduction and a full pdf download of the Report.
By Mandy Turner, Senior Researcher, Security in Context
Abstract: War is an acute and urgent crisis in international relations and therefore the Russia-Ukraine war provides a useful lens through which to analyse the emerging multipolar order. This paper makes three main arguments. First, is that in the context of contenders capable of challenging Pax Americana, Global South nonalignment has again become a significant foreign policy stance. Second, multipolarity is not the same as the end of Western dominance, but it does signal that Western hegemony is no longer absolute. Third, is that the scene is being set for an adversarial multipolar order because the West appears willing to employ a variety of techniques to shore up its privileged position.
Introduction
On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. A United Nations General Assembly resolution (UNGA ES-11/1) and an International Court of Justice ruling demanded that Russia immediately withdraw its troops, and Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe. The United States, European states, and their allies (here collectively referred to as “the West”) swiftly condemned the invasion, imposed far-reaching economic sanctions against Russia, and committed resources to assist Ukraine. However, there has been a different response from states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (here collectively referred to as “the Global South”).1 While Global South states have voiced widespread support for the principle of sovereignty and the right of Ukraine to self-determination, the majority have resisted attempts to make them take sides with the West against Russia. These efforts have mostly been expressed through the language of nonalignment and through contributions to debates and voting patterns in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as reactions in other public fora and the media. Most notably, no Global South state has signed up for the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia and many retain cordial relations with Moscow, despite experiencing intense pressure from Western states. This diplomatic disagreement piqued my interest and led me to further explore it to answer two questions. First, is this an important development; what is nonalignment and how can we understand it? Second, what does this tell us about the current state of international relations, particularly the relationship between the Global South and the West?
Nonalignment has a long history, first emerging in the late 1950s during the period of Cold War rivalry between the United States and Europe (the “First World”) and the Soviet Union (the “Second World”). It was a central pillar of the “Third World” as a political project.2 As a policy and alliance it was mostly (though not exclusively) created by states which had experienced colonialism; it demanded the right to foreign policy independence as well as a more equitable and just international order. But with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, nonalignment lost its relevance and was largely ignored in the context of a Western-dominated unipolar international order (also referred to here as Pax Americana).3
Despite this, its institutional form, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), limped on as a loose coalition of around 120 states – no longer known as the “Third World” but by a variety of different monikers such as “developing nations” or more recently the “Global South” – with regular summits and a rotating chair. Yet the strategy of nonalignment still held little political clout. Until the Russia-Ukraine war.
After 30 years of irrelevancy, nonalignment has again become an important policy for Global South states.4 This is because we are on the cusp of a new multipolar order as indicated by the growth of south-south relations; the emergence and expansion of the BRICS alliance; and a booming Chinese economy expanding its trade, investment, and cooperation with many states through its “Belt and Road Initiative.” These developments all signal a potential change in the international order away from unipolarity towards multipolarity.5
And yet growing multipolarity is not the same as the demise of Western dominance, although it does, however, signal that Western hegemony is no longer absolute.6 This shift away from unipolarity is why the current period is so dangerous and unstable: because the West, led by the United States, seeks to retain its privileged position against revisions to the international order and appears willing to employ a variety of techniques to ensure this. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is regarded by the West as constituting a direct challenge to Pax Americana on the European continent, so its response has been swift and coercive to isolate Russia and ensure Western hegemony through “coercive” (military assistance and sanctions) and “consensual” means (moral legitimacy and multilateral institutions). The Global South’s nonaligned position during this crisis, and Western responses to it, therefore, provide a useful lens through which to analyse the current moment.
Nonalignment in the past
Nonalignment initially emerged in an era of national liberation movements, decolonisation, Arab and African socialism, and demands for a more equitable international economic and political order. The political strategy of nonalignment developed in tandem with an economic strategy – both were designed to reset an international system dominated by the West. Domination by the Soviet Union was also opposed, but this opposition was provoked by Soviet interference in the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe, not because it held the reins of global economic and political power. Various institutions and initiatives such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and the Group of 77 (G77) were the driving institutional forces behind “Third World” desires and demands.
The NAM came into existence formally at a meeting of 25 states in Belgrade in September 1961, organized by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia, and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia – who became its emblematic leaders.7 The NAM included Cuba and Yugoslavia, two states that identified as Communist, but also represented a variety of regime types from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Despite their heterogeneity, the states involved had core concerns. The conference document from the first NAM meeting pledged the support of its members for disarmament, self-determination, anticolonialism, peace, and an end to racism.8
There was significant overlap (of membership and ideology) between the NAM and the Group of 77, which was formed in 1964. The campaign for a NIEO, as well as issues such as apartheid in South Africa and the Israel-Palestine conflict, united NAM member states, although there were some disagreements e.g., over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.9 Over the decades, nonalignment has understandably morphed in response to changes in international relations, but it has always been part of a political project to challenge and change the system. Nonalignment is not the same as neutrality, which is a strategy adopted by some states during war time, and during the Cold War was the policy of Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, and Switzerland (none of which joined the NAM).10
In the past three decades, the NAM has struggled to find relevance in the unipolar international order led by the United States. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, NAM’s original opposition to the East-West divide was no longer relevant; opposing the hegemony of the West in global affairs, a constant primary issue, now became its sole concern.11 The 1992 NAM Jakarta Summit emphasised two topics that affected its membership: disarmament and development, especially opposition to structural adjustment and the trade policies of Western states. In terms of foreign policy, despite divisions over some U.S. military interventions, the NAM member states were united in their opposition to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and opposed several sanctions regimes imposed by the United States including against Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. While the NAM had some voice and influence during the decades of multipolar influence, during the unipolar era it was largely ignored. But the international context is changing again, and Global South opposition to Western dominance has the potential to move beyond just rhetoric.
Nonalignment in the present
Current NAM policies emphasise reform of the UN Security Council, self-determination (including the right to independent foreign relations), sustainable development, criticism of U.S. foreign policy, and the development of south-south cooperation. In the current context of global neoliberal capitalism, there is disagreement over whether to regard the BRICS alliance – initially of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – as a progressive economic counterpart to political nonalignment akin to Cold War days.
Critics charge that the BRICS do not advocate an NIEO-style leftist agenda and that they do not represent the interests of the “poor and downtrodden” but are essentially a group of ascendant powers, orchestrated by China, the “aspiring hegemon.”12 This criticism tends to romanticise the “Third World” political project of the 1960s and 1970s as revolutionary, but the historical record is more complex and shows that it largely also was focused on reform of the Western-dominated order, not its overthrow. Such romanticism also ignores how much of the NAM and the G77’s initial demands had already been diluted even by the 1980s, and how marginalised it has been since the 1990s. Furthermore, the BRICS will not merely be an elite alliance of ascendant powers for much longer due to its rapidly expanding membership. In January 2024, Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates joined and there are a further 40 countries waiting in the wings, indicating wide support for the BRICS from Global South states.
A BRICS alliance growing in economic power and membership is going to be an important international actor, although some commentators are more sceptical of its ability to act collectively by pointing to key disagreements and tensions between its members.13 Nevertheless, some commentators see a potential for the BRICS to shake up the unipolar system and institute a more “cooperative multipolarity.”14 Yet, multipolarity could just as easily be adversarial rather than cooperative.
Whether one is a critic or a cheerleader, what unites the BRICS and the wider Global South is a dissatisfaction with the international economic and political order that currently favours Western needs and priorities. While critics correctly point out differences between today and the heyday of “Third Worldism,” there are certainly echoes of the NIEO agenda in the BRICS’ goal of reforming the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the UN (particularly the Security Council). These goals are far more achievable now than in previous decades because of the growing economic power of the BRICS alliance and greater south-south cooperation.
Significantly, all BRICS members are either members of the NAM or have observer status. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was obviously not involved in the NAM, and China was not a member although it was sympathetic. Today Russia and China, both regarded as ascendant rivals by the West, are observer members and are actively encouraging the revival of the movement. On 28 August 2022, for instance, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, stated: “Multipolarity has become an objective fact that is taking shape right before our eyes. India, Russia, and a number of countries from the Non-Aligned Movement are becoming centres of economic growth and political influence that should have ‘new international order pillar’ status.”15 The involvement of Russia and China makes it trickier to understand the potential role of the NAM and the BRICS, and the possibility for policies and actions that assist the Global South in general, not just an alternative hegemon (or hegemons), particularly because any changes to the Western-dominated international order will also benefit China and Russia.
The Russia-Ukraine war and nonalignment
The reasons behind nonalignment on the Russia-Ukraine war vary across Global South states: some are the product of states holding trade and cordial diplomatic relations with Russia, some are based on military relations with Russia (particularly arms sales), some are based on historic connections with the former Soviet Union, and some come from a foreign policy position that advocates dialogue and diplomacy over confrontation.
India is nonaligned: it abstained during the UNGA ES-11/1 vote passed on 2 March 2022 and has so far resisted Western encouragement that it take a tougher stance against Russia. China has also taken a nonaligned position and abstained during the UNGA ES-11/1 vote. Middle Eastern states are divided, reflecting their different foreign alliances, but even those with strong relations with Western states have been reluctant to support its attempts to isolate Russia.16 Latin American nations, in general, have also been muted in their criticism of Russia, although many voted for UNGA ES-11/1.17 There is no consensus amongst African states, although the highest number of abstentions for UNGA ES-11/1 came from the African continent; and its multilateral organisation, the African Union, is strongly committed to nonalignment. The reactions of the nations of south-east and north-east Asia have varied widely, reflecting already-existing patterns of diplomacy and alliances. Yet despite important nuances, there is a visible difference between the responses of Western versus Global South states towards the Russia-Ukraine war.
Unsurprisingly, nonalignment is not popular amongst Western states. U.S. representative to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, in a 24 March 2022 statement said: “There is no neutral ground here.”18 This hostility towards the policy is not new. In 1956, during the Cold War, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles described nonalignment as “immoral and short-sighted.”19 In those days, the West responded to “Third World” nonalignment through a variety of coercive and persuasive means which occasionally sparked proxy wars with the Soviet Union.
Current dynamics are similar. Trade and aid have always come with a price tag, but Western states are now explicitly discussing attaching conditions to them as well as potentially imposing sanctions against other nations who do business with Russia. Western states have also made promises to support (albeit limited) reform of some multilateral institutions such as the UN Security Council and the G20.20 While the political economy of patronage has always been harnessed to support allies and punish enemies, the difference now is that growing south-south cooperation reduces the potential coercive and persuasive nature of these techniques.
Nevertheless, Global South states more reliant on Western trade and aid, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, are still vulnerable to the weaponization of trade and aid. Thomas-Greenfield reminded African leaders that while “Russia’s bilateral trade with sub-Saharan Africa is about $7 billion dollars in 2021, […] what they are getting in terms of trade between the United States and Europe is somewhere around $44 billion.”21 The United States is also prepared to use force if more pacific methods fail. In March 2021, the House of Representatives passed the Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act HR 7311 which mandates the United States to track the actions of Russia and its proxies in terms of military operations, financial flows, investments, and political influence in Africa. It also mandates removing aid and imposing sanctions against African governments and officials who assist Russia’s influence and activities.22 For HR 7311 to become law, it needs to be passed by the U.S. Senate, which has so far not happened. While the stalling of its passage could be an indication that it is unlikely to enter the U.S. statute books, it could be activated at any time.
The EU has also been considering how to use trade and aid to force the Global South to side with the West against Russia. According to a leaked confidential report in July 2022, the EU held secret discussions to consider tying aid provided to African nations dependent upon them sharing the EU’s “common values and joint vision.”23 This statement echoes the “standard of civilisation” language used during the period of Western colonialism to deny self-determination to non-Western peoples. Today, such Eurocentric avatars of the “superiority” of “Western values” are received with cynicism in the Global South because of its experiences of an international system dominated by Western power and “values” which gave it the slave trade, colonialism, military interventions, covert operations, assassinations, coups, and sanctions. During a UN Security Council meeting on the Russia-Ukraine crisis on 25 February 2023, Mexico’s representative, Juan Ramon de la Fuentes Ramirez, pointed to the history of western aggression and intervention against his own country: “Mexico has itself suffered four invasions over the course of its history as an independent state, two by France and two by the United States. The first intervention by the United States in 1846 led to the loss of almost half of our national territory at that time.”24 So, it is no surprise that accusations of hypocrisy by Western leaders have raised Global South hackles and eyebrows, for instance by French President, Emmanuel Macron, during his visit to Cameroon in July 2022.25 Responses to the U.S. threat of sanctions have also been robust. Zimbabwe’s President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, for instance, compared HR 7311 to the 1901 Platt Amendment, which denied Cuba the right to have foreign relations with any other country than the United States.26
Western responses to multipolarity
We are now on the cusp of a multipolar international system: there are processes and changes which are challenging Western domination. Yet Pax Americana is not in decline: the international system remains an unequal, racialised, capitalist hierarchy with the United States specifically and the West more generally at its apex. The United States still dominates economically, politically, and militarily, despite increasing references to the demise of U.S. power made by Western think-tanks and political elites, particularly those based in Washington DC. The Western alliance still largely decides the shape of the global order. A shift towards a more multipolar order should not necessarily be regarded as a seesaw in a children’s playground: when one side goes up, another side must come down. What is changing is the West’s ability to continue to dominate international relations without negotiation, compromise, or reform. Unfortunately, the United States regards any moves towards multipolarity as a threat: its 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy presented Russia and China as competitors that had to be opposed and contained. Its Western allies have expressed similar “zero-sum” mentalities.
The West has therefore been trying to use the Russia-Ukraine War as an opportunity to portray itself as the defender of world peace and stability, while simultaneously smearing Russia and China as authoritarians which only have their own interests at heart.27 Yet it is difficult to erase or put a positive spin on over 20 years of the “Global War on Terror,” the military invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, widespread drone warfare, an exponential rise in the use of sanctions by the United States against governments and individuals regarded as “acting against its interests,” and a vicious counterterrorism agenda forced on the UN which undermines international humanitarian and human rights law.28
In August 2022, for instance, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, made a high-profile trip to Egypt, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda and Ethiopia, praising Africa for resisting Western attempts to impose a unipolar world order, and for not joining sanctions against Russia despite Western pressure.29 After his meeting with Lavrov, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni described Moscow as a “partner” in the struggle against colonialism going back a century.30
In a startling recognition of the value of incentives in an era of growing multipolarity, the United States has promised further aid, investment, and trade for the Global South, plus more representation in the institutions of global governance such as the UN Security Council and the G20.31 If these changes come to pass, then a few years of nonalignment in the context of increasing multipolarity will have achieved more for Global South states than the past three decades of Pax Americana and the “liberal world order.”
Conclusion: The scene is being set for an adversarial multipolarity
War is an acute and urgent crisis in international relations and therefore the Russia-Ukraine war provides a useful lens through which to analyse the current international system. The West’s response has been to completely isolate Russia and support Ukraine, citing threats to international peace and security as well as infringement of international law. Global South states have supported Ukraine’s right to self-determination but have taken a nonaligned position on isolating Russia. From this, three important lessons can be gleaned about the relationship between the West and the Global South in an era of growing multipolarity.
The first is that Global South nonalignment is part of a wider political agenda. Despite alterations over the decades, the fundamental core principles of this political agenda are: support for sovereignty and peaceful relations between states; criticism of Western foreign policy; and calls for reform of the Western-dominated international order. Western politicians are only now taking Global South nonalignment seriously because growing multipolarity makes its campaign for a revision of the Western-dominated international system more credible.
The second lesson is that Global South states are rightly suspicious of Western intentions and actions because the West’s commitment to sovereignty, rights, and international law has always been partial and applied in a racist manner. This opportunism is not only clear from the past few hundred years of international history but is also obvious more recently when Western responses to the Israel-Gaza war are compared to the Russia-Ukraine war. Most Global South states (with a few minor exceptions) support the Palestinian right to self-determination and an end to Israel’s occupation and apartheid regime. Western support for Israel, especially during its 2023-24 war on Gaza that is regarded as genocidal by many Global South states, is seen as an example of blatant double standards.
The third lesson we can learn about the West’s relationship with the Global South is that the West still thinks it can rule the world the way it wants using all tools at its disposal to defend the international order in which it is dominant. The goal of the Global South is to force a revision of the international system towards a multipolarity that is more beneficial than the current order. Just how much reform the West permits will determine the level of violence that we will experience over the coming few decades. We are on the cusp of a multipolar order, but all signs currently point to it being adversarial rather than cooperative.
Footnotes
1: In this article, the terms “the West” and the “Global South” do not refer to geographical locations, but to relative power and wealth, as well as foreign policy alignments. “The West” refers to the countries of Europe, USA, the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Japan, Israel, and South Korea – those countries which are key allies and junior partners in Pax Americana. The “Global South” refers to former colonised countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Asia – this covers a wide variety of countries with varying degrees of power and wealth, as well as different foreign policies.
2: Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The New Press, 2008.
3: Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, Verso, 2014.
4: Gwumaka Kivukwe, “No Cold War Please, How Europeans Should Engage Non-aligned States”, 30 June 2022, European Council on Foreign Relations, available at: https://ecfr.eu/article/no-cold-war-please-how-europeans-should-engage-non-aligned-states/.
5: Jonathan Steele, “Compare Iraq With Ukraine: It’s Clear the Era of US Global Dominance is Over”, 20 March 2023, The Guardian; available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/mar/20/iraq-ukraine-us-global-supremacy-washington-power-china-global-south
6: I prefer the term “hegemon” to “great power” because it designates a type of domination based on both coercion and consent. IR scholars use the designation “hard” and “soft” power, but Gramsci’s understanding is more sophisticated and helps us to understand how consent is generated and becomes “common sense”.
7: The conference was attended by 25 countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Yemen, Myanmar, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia.
8: Jurgen Dinkel, The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992), 2019, Brill.
9: Arch W. Singham, and Shirley Hune, Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Zed Books, 1986, pp. 190, 214-215.
10: Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, et al. Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs, 2015, Routledge.
11: Proc. of the Fourteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba. 2006. Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/14NAMSummit-Havana-Compiled.pdf
12: Tithi Bhattacharya and Gareth Dale, “Is BRICS+ An Anti-Colonial Formation Worth Cheering from the Left? Far From It”, 13 September 2023, Truthout, available at: https://truthout.org/articles/is-brics-an-anti-colonial-formation-worth-cheering-from-the-left-far-from-it/
13: Alan Beattie, “The BRICS Don’t Stack Up as a Committee to Rule the World”, 24 August 2023, Financial Times, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/dc227378-6e08-46bd-abc0-77344b1cac28
14: Richard Falk, “G7 and BRICS’ Vision of the Future: Coercive Unipolarity or Cooperative Multipolarity”, 8 September 2023, Counterpunch, available at: https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/09/08/g-7-and-brics-visions-of-the-future-coercive-unipolarity-or-cooperative-multipolarity/
15: Zvezda, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Zvezda television channel for a documentary covering the Non-Aligned Movement”, 28 August 2022, Zvezda, Moscow, available at: https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1827555/?lang=en
16: International Crisis Group, “The Impact of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in the Middle East and North Africa”, 14 April 2022, ICG, available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/impact-russias-invasion-ukraine-middle-east-and-north-africa
17: Oliver Stuenkel, “The Ukraine War May Hasten the Return of Great Power Politics in Latin America”, 23 June 2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/06/23/ukraine-war-may-hasten-return-of-great-power-politics-in-latin-america-pub-87381
18: United States Mission to the UN, “Remarks at the UN Security Council Stakeout Following the Adoption of a UN General Assembly Resolution on the Humanitarian Situation in Ukraine”, 24 March 2022, available at: https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-by-ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfield-at-the-un-security-council-stakeout-following-the-adoption-of-a-un-general-assembly-resolution-on-the-hu/
19: Stewart M. Patrick, “The Non-Aligned Movement’s Crisis”, 30 August 2012, Council for Foreign Relations, available at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/nonaligned-movements-crisis
20: Zainab Usman, Juliette Ovadia and Aline Abayo, “The US-Africa Leaders’ Summit Marks a Seismic Shift in Relations with the Continent”, 22 December 2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/22/u.s.-africa-leaders-summit-marks-seismic-shift-in-relations-with-continent-pub-88692
21: Ebenezer Obadare, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Might Drive a Wedge Between the West and Africa”, 22 March 2022, Council for Foreign Relations, available at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-invasion-ukraine-may-drive-wedge-between-west-and-africa
22: United States Congress Gov, “HR7311 – Countering Malign Russian Activities in Russia Act”, Full Text, 31 March 2022, available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7311/text.
23: Vince Chadwick, “Exclusive: Internal Report Shows EU Fears Losing Africa Over Ukraine”, 22 July 2022, Devex, available at: https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-internal-report-shows-eu-fears-losing-africa-over-ukraine-103694
24: UNTV Live “UN Security Council Resolution Vetoed, 25 February 2022”, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bfzvRN3FYDA
25: Adam Taylor, “Africa is Being Pushed to Take Sides in the Ukraine War”, 28 July 2022, The Washington Post, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/28/macron-africa-lavrov/
26: Bulawayo 24 Hour News, “Mnangagwa Lashes Out at United States”, 13 June 2022, available at: https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-220137.html
27: Francis Fukuyama, “Putin’s War on the Liberal World Order”, 4 March 2022, Financial Times, London, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/d0331b51-5d0e-4132-9f97-c3f41c7d75b3
28: Saferworld and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, “The Rise of Counterterrorism at the United Nations: Two Decades Later”, September 2021, available at: https://ny.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/The_rise_of_counter-terrorism_at_the_UN-pages_HQ.pdf.
29: Antonio Cascas, “Russia’s Reengagement with Africa Pays Off”, 26 July 2022, Deutsche Welle, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/russias-reengagement-with-africa-pays-off/a-61064011
30: Chris Muronze, “Russian and Western Politicians Vie for Influence Amid Africa Caution on Ukraine War”, 17 August 2022, AlJazeera, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/17/russian-and-western-politicians-vie-for-influence-in-africa
31: Zainab Usman, Juliette Ovadia and Aline Abayo, “The US-Africa Leaders’ Summit Marks a Seismic Shift in Relations with the Continent”, 22 December 2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/22/u.s.-africa-leaders-summit-marks-seismic-shift-in-relations-with-continent-pub-88692; Trevor Hunnicutt and Nandita Bose, “Biden Bets on Emerging Markets as Xi Snubs G20”, 7 September 2023, Reuters, available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/emerging/biden-doubles-down-emerging-markets-xi-snubs-g20-2023-09-07/
Mandy Turner is a senior researcher with Security in Context. Her research focuses on the political economy of conflict and peace, humanitarianism and multilateralism, and the situation in Israel and Palestine. She has 25 years’ experience of these issues and has pursued research, writing and consultancy work through a variety of sectors. Her most recent book is an edited collection called From the River to the Sea: Palestine and Israel in the Shadow of ‘Peace’ (Rowman and Littlefield, 2019), which will be published in Arabic by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Doha) in 2024. Her previous books are: The Politics of International Intervention: The Tyranny of Peace (co-edited with F.P. Kühn. Routledge, 2016); Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De development and Beyond (co-edited with O. Shweiki. PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), and Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding (co edited with M. Pugh and N. Cooper. PalgraveMacmillan, 2008). She can be contacted on: mandy@securityincontext.org
