The statements made and opinions expressed in this publication are solely the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Security in Context network, its partner organizations, or its funders.
By Mandy Turner
Citation: Turner, Mandy, 2025. “Multilateralism from the Margins: Mapping Challenges, Contestations, and Prospects for Cooperation and Solidarity in Global Interactions, Conversations from a Roundtable in October 2024,” Security in Context Policy Dialogue 25-01. April 2025, Security in Context.
On October 6 and 7, 2024, Security in Context (SiC) organized a policy/scholarly roundtable which was held at the Institute for Advanced Study in the Global South at Northwestern University in Qatar (#IAS_NUQ) in Doha. This brought together people whose work critiques prevailing narratives and explores alternative paradigms in various domains, including (but not limited to) political economy and international economic relations, climate change and natural resources, conflict and militarism, the “global war on terror” and international law, and social movements and activism.
The gathering included geographers, sociologists, area specialists, economists, IR scholars, historians, and anthropologists – it truly was an interdisciplinary meeting of minds. We also tried to ensure a cross-section of experts whose work is focused on different geographical regions to facilitate comparative analyses.
Our main goal was to create a space to assess and challenge mainstream ideas and policy, and to imagine and discuss new agendas and avenues for progressive change. Our discussions were driven by a set of broad questions that structured all our sessions (which were divided thematically as explained below). These were:
1. What are the hegemonic principles and practices that govern this political and policy space? Who are the dominant actors?
2. Who benefits and who is marginalized in current processes and practices in this political and policy space? This can include global, regional, and local actors and spaces.
3. What are the critiques and alternative strategies being proposed? Who are the actors proposing these strategies? Do they offer a potentially more inclusive “alter-space” or are they budding hegemons (they could be both)? This can include global, regional, and local actors and spaces.
4. What would more inclusive politics, processes, and policies look like? What are the obstacles and challenges to achieving these?
5. What are the possibilities of creating an agenda for a “multilateralism from the margins”? Who or what constitutes “the margins” for you?
This was a closed, invitation-only roundtable to facilitate conversational, non-confrontational, and collegial, critical in-depth discussion. But as part of our commitment to engaging in public policy discussions with our partners and hosts, with people in the locales hosting our meetings, we also organized two open public events at #IAS_NUQ. The first one was held on October 6, which covered the general themes of the roundtable. The second one was held on October 7 – on the one-year anniversary of Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood Operation and the launching soon thereafter of Israel’s genocidal war against Palestinians in Gaza and its increase of repression against Palestinians in the West Bank and Israel.
This report provides a “Chatham House Rule” summary of our discussions. This means that we have summarized the conversations, but we have not identified who said what. We took this approach because we wanted to ensure that people could speak freely.
We regard this roundtable to be the beginning of a conversation, not the end. We intend to continue to think through, with friends and allies, about how to promote and foster social justice on a global scale. Now, more than ever, these conversations are urgently needed.
Understanding Current Global Dynamics: Change and Continuities, Challenges and Dangers
Our global economic and political systems have been shaped by racial hierarchies, capitalist dynamics, and colonial legacies which perpetuate the exploitation and marginalization of racialized groups and social classes. Reflecting these inequalities, contemporary multilateral institutions and practices largely reinforce the interests of a small number of powerful Western states while the voices and concerns of Global South states and disenfranchised communities within Western states are marginalized. Yet the institutions, policies, and practices for regulating global interactions across the realms of peace, security, and development are also sites of continual contestation and struggle over the distribution and governance of resources, power, and control.
We are now on the cusp of a multipolar international system; there are processes and changes taking place which are challenging Western authority. Yet Pax Americana is not in decline. The United States still dominates economically, politically, and militarily, and the Western alliance still largely decides on the shape of the global order—the most recent genocide in Gaza serving as a testament to this. But what is changing is the West’s ability to continue to dominate international relations without negotiation, compromise, or reform. Furthermore, Western hegemony – i.e., its legitimacy to dominate by consent – is also waning.
South-South cooperation (encompassing economic, political, and social collaborations among developing countries), alongside the growing economic influence of the Gulf Cooperation Council states and China, is significantly reshaping global capitalism, fostering greater autonomy and mutual collaborations within the Global South. This is already altering global power dynamics and creating new patterns of influence in international forums through alliances and collective advocacy. Global South states have made it very clear that one of their goals is to force a revision of the international system towards one that benefits it more than the current order. This covers the gamut of multilateral agreements, policies, and strategies across the realms of peace, security, and development. Pre-existing Global South forums have been re-energized (e.g., the Non-Aligned Movement) and new ones have been established (e.g., the BRICS+) which are pushing for reforms and different strategies in global governance forums such the UN and the WTO. The potential is there for Global South states to help shape new multilateral norms and policies; the key question is just how much change Western states are willing to permit.
Other, non-state actors—social movements (including NGOs and activist groups) and businesses (particularly multinational companies)—are also instrumental and active in shaping debates, policies, and multilateral agreements on diverse issues ranging from trade and finance, workers’ rights, control over natural resources, climate justice, and human rights. Through lobbying, sheer economic clout, and the influence of high-ranking “revolving door” personnel, businesses influence global policies. Through campaigning, advocacy, and direct action, social movements amplify community voices to try to influence policymakers, although success is patchy.
There are several themes and topics we considered to be of crucial importance to understanding the current moment. These included:
1. International trade agreements, lending and debt, and banking and finance which continue to sustain a global order where resources and labor from the Global South are extracted for the benefit of the Global North. How do these agreements affect global and local economies? Who benefits and who is marginalized? Are South-South cooperation and alternative sources of development finance from Global South actors, such as the GCC and China, likely to challenge and change this – and if so, in what way?
2. Multilateral cooperation is both essential and contentious when it comes to climate change. The Paris Agreement, widely lauded as a landmark achievement, is non-binding, lacks resources, and ignores that developed countries (the historically high emitters) are responsible for the climate crisis. Annual COP meetings have been coopted, coiffured for the world’s media, and sponsored by the very companies that require regulation. How can we understand the dynamics of the climate crisis, international negotiations, the role of developed versus developing countries, the intersection of climate policies with economic and social justice, and the role of disaster management narratives and business actors?
3. Human rights, international law, and conflict also lie at the heart of multilateral efforts. We therefore need to understand the role of power dynamics and their implications for global peace and security, particularly considering recent conflicts and instances of powerful states violating international laws without significant consequences.
4. What is the nature of US power; is it in decline and/or being challenged? Since 9/11, the United States has led an aggressive global counter-terrorism agenda impacting multilateral forums and policies related to banking and finance, human rights, and development. What is the potential role of South-South cooperation in sidestepping punitive US sanctions?
5. Developing countries are endowed with a substantial share of the world's natural resources, which include minerals, fossil fuels, forests, water, and arable land. Equally, these are often in areas which are home to indigenous peoples marginalized in politics at national and international levels. How do multilateral agreements address issues of sovereignty, sustainability, and equitable access? Which actors and voices are influential during the negotiation and creation of these agreements, and with what impact?
6. Discussion of multilateral organizations such as the UN, regional organizations, and inter-state institutions in the Global South. Time and again, we returned to considering what kind of organizations and strategies already exist, or can be built, to promote the voices and agency of marginalized populations in international decision-making processes.
There were eight key themes and conundrums that loomed large throughout the two days.
1. The problems humanity faces are intersectional, so any one of the issues we were discussing should not be privileged/focused on at the cost of the others (e.g., climate crisis over militarism). There was agreement that we needed to consider these issues through the lens of global capitalism and imperialism today. We therefore need to grasp how, if at all, global capitalism and imperialism has changed and, if so, the implications for social justice and who or what can be regarded as a progressive actor.
2. How to understand, unpack, and decipher global structures of power and dominance. Who has the power to dictate the nature of world order through consent, through processes and frameworks, and through violence and military alliances? How does this manifest itself and/or interact with local and regional levels of power and dominance?
3. There were disagreements over whether Pax Americana is in decline and how to understand the potential impact of this. There was a general agreement that the United States was still the only global superpower and that its type of dominance and rule was different from previous empires. But there was some disagreement on whether its hegemony (i.e., its ability to rule by consent in a Gramscian sense) was in terminal decline, and if it was, then what this means.
4. There was constant discussion and disagreement over how to define the “Global South” and whether the term was useful. There was a consensus that we need to nuance this term because there are many pockets of marginalization and poverty in the Global North, and many pockets of wealth and influence in the Global South. Some regarded the concept to be relevant not in geographical terms but as one rooted in a political program for change, particularly because the legacies of colonialism still weigh heavily in large parts of the Global South, while others argued it is a depoliticized term suitable for capture by rising South countries at the expense of others. But there was consensus on the idea that imperial violence continues to play a central role as a “disciplining” force in global governance terms.
5. When it came to discussing what we mean by “the margins,” generally we decided that this encompassed those with limited ability to structure or change the relations of power – locally, regionally or internationally. So, our analyses of the location/s and nature of hegemonic power are crucial.
6. This informed our discussions on the “dark side” of South-South relations, and how to understand the role of the BRICS+ and other multilateral/regional forums outside of the imperial center of North America and Europe. We considered whether the BRICS+ is a forum for potential new hegemons or sub-hegemons and a manifestation of sub-imperialism. We discussed the history of “third world” multilateral groups such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). We then considered NAM today and the newly resurrected campaign for a NIEO.
7. We looked at the role of solidarity and the various locations where potential progressive partnerships could be built and the different actors that could be involved. We asked whether states and state elites can be part of a progressive alliance. Can regional alliances and even multilateral forums be progressive spaces? We generally agreed that a “multilateralism from the margins” is intersectional – it operates at the global, regional, and local levels. So, this means that it is not just based on “activists” but includes a wide variety of actors. We considered that our role as scholars was to identify the power relations behind who is included and who is excluded, in particular who gets the right to self-defense, and who has the right to a voice? We thought of “the margins” as the place/space of insurgency.
8. The role of history and memory was constantly invoked. It was agreed that empire relies on amnesia, so we needed to historicize, look for comparisons and lessons learned from other periods and spaces, and not regard the current moment as unique. Other epochs have also experienced huge violence, oppression, and inequality. Some expressed skepticism and pessimism about the current potential for more liberatory futures, while some were more optimistic. But we all agreed there was a need to discuss what a more liberatory future might look like, even if we do not all agree on its content.
Below are brief summaries from our five thematic sessions: 1) international trade and development; 2) international law and the institutions of global governance; 3) militarism and violence; 4) extractivism, the environment, and climate change; and 5) activism and social movements.
Session 1: International Trade and Development
This session considered whether and how international trade agreements, lending and debt, banking, and finance sustain an unequal global order. It also discussed South-South cooperation and alternative sources of development finance from Global South actors such as the GCC and China. Conversations revolved around whether these new processes are challenging and changing the global political economy; or, if they are not, then what do they signify?
1. We discussed whether the Global South is still being exploited for the benefit of the Global North. Geographically speaking, it was pointed out that countries in the Global North (such as the United States and the United Kingdom) have areas which are very poor and marginalized. It was argued that recognizing this is important to building solidarity. There were disagreements about this though. Some pointed out that a significant chunk of the Global South is not developing; growth is not an option for them, and they are living the impacts of environmental damage every day.
2. In terms of the Global South as a political project (rather than a geographical designation), we discussed the historical legacies of the NIEO, the different models of justice and development, and the alternative international development nexus advocated throughout the 1960s and 1970s. We considered how the newly resurrected campaign for a NIEO as a program of action encompasses the problems of reproducing exploitation within the South itself, the competition between development and climate, the problems created by extractivism, and weakened solidarity.
3. Skepticism was expressed about the “decline” of US power in that the world economy is so fundamentally centered on access to the American market, on the dollar, and on the infrastructure of trade rules constructed over 50 years of unchallenged imperialism. There was agreement that the nature of US empire is unique – it was constructed through rebuilding its adversaries by tying them to itself, by defeating labor and anti-colonial movements, and defeating alternatives to Anglo-American capitalism. However, there was also a lot of discussion about how the United States and its two main allies – the European Union and Japan – are in relative stagnation, while China and others are in marked ascent. It was agreed, though, that the majority of the Global South remains the biggest victim of this inequitable system.
4. We discussed how the United States expresses its power through economic and trade sanctions, which it currently applies to around 25 countries worldwide as a method of economic warfare. We focused specifically on the case of Venezuela. In 2017, Venezuela became subject to the most stringent US sanctions since Cuba in the 1960s. This devastated Venezuela's economy, which was already in trouble because of corruption and domestic issues, drove it to hyperinflation (which peaked at 63,000% in 2018), and fueled the migration crisis (25% of the Venezuelan population now live abroad). This led the Venezuelan government to seek ways to subvert these sanctions and remain in power through alliances with countries such as Turkey, Belarus, Russia, India, and China.
5. We talked about global value chains and whether actors can be classified as engaging in a politics of Global North or Global South in terms of trade patterns that contribute to development or underdevelopment. While some were skeptical, most pointed out that on the empirical question of flows of surpluses, there is still an unequal exchange of labor values where imperial systems benefit from cheap labor and the depletion of non-renewable resources located in the Global South. Furthermore, there is no recirculation of the revenues of profit into local job creation, infrastructure, investment, etc.
6. We discussed the changes to the global political economy that the rise of China represents. The rise in the number of countries whose major trading partner is now China is extremely significant, because with trade comes influence and connections. However, it was also pointed out that China is rising within a system and within structures that it does not control. It remains dependent on a world economy and global economic infrastructure shaped by the United States. We generally agreed that it was crucial to hold on to understanding how global power is operating and the asymmetries. In some sense, therefore, the terms Global North and Global South are still helpful. But we also agreed it is essential to avoid binaries because it is crucial to consider other centers of power with the ability to extract surpluses as a sub-imperial site of accumulation.
7. We spoke about how to interpret China’s claims that it is part of the Global South, especially because China constantly refers to the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. It was pointed out that the idea of Chinese “debt diplomacy” has been weaponized in American policy circles to refer to China’s finance loans to Global South countries. Whereas the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and its investment in infrastructures is presented by China’s allies as South-South solidarity.
8. We discussed what fractions of global capital can mobilize state power to shape the world economy around them. The GCC states, for instance, have played a central role for the last 50 years in shaping global capitalist relations. The 1970s oil price hikes fueled third world debt and GCC petrodollars made the financial reserves possible for structural adjustment programs – both of which fueled the end of the developmental state and their opening up to the ravages of a global neoliberal capitalist plunder. GCC states have managed to shape around themselves flows of labor, goods, finance, etc., first in the Arab world and then on a much bigger level. The UAE is, for instance, the 4th largest investor in Africa, especially in critical minerals. Saudi Arabia has invested USD $41 million in Dominica for infrastructure to rebuild its capital city. But still, Gulf states are not in a position to alter a framework that was already set in place.
Session 2: International Law and Institutions of Global Governance
International law lies at the heart of global governance and multilateralism. In recent decades, Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) scholars have offered a powerful critique grounded in a historical analysis of power dynamics and colonialism. This session focused on the role of international law and multilateral organizations (such as the UN, regional organizations, and inter-state institutions in the Global South). Given the historical context of the meeting, conversations focused on Palestine and international law, the role of international law in general, and whether international legal forums can operate as sites of resistance.
1. We started by discussing TWAIL, its understanding of international law as an ongoing process informed by politics and history, and its use of the term “third world” to emphasize that international law is inherently imperial and colonial. Beyond that foundation, TWAIL scholars differ. On one end of the spectrum there is a complete rejection of the existing system of international law and a demand to replace it entirely with one that is more just and representative of most of the world. The other end of the spectrum represents critical engagement with international law to bring about social and political change.
2. Our discussions were mostly focused on i) whether and how international law can play a role in fighting the dehumanization of people; and ii) the important roles that Global South states and critical legal practitioners are playing in navigating the unequal application of international law while also using them to combat oppression. It was agreed that international law is a site of power and therefore reflects the ideas and rights of the powerful. But Global South states and other actors are using this system to push back from the margins and assert humanity by law. A case was made for seeing international legal sites as forums of contestation, just as with any political site.
3. There was a discussion about what different actors were able to do within the current system of international law and global governance – such as the incremental pushing of debates, challenging and changing the language used – that can help to support struggles outside these policy realms. It was acknowledged, for instance, that the language of “human rights” came partly from law and partly from activists.
4. We considered how a type of solidarity can be practiced through international legal means by the ways in which states pursue or do not pursue what is known as their erga omnes obligations, i.e., that international law requires all states, including those that are not affected physically or directly by genocide and other mass atrocities, to respect and to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, Convention Against Torture, etc. South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice can be seen in this light, as a powerful display of solidarity with Palestinians. South Africa’s actions have certainly encouraged other Global South actors to join forces and put solidarity into action through the medium of international law. Of course, the question remains whether these acts of solidarity through judicial means will impact state actions in meaningful ways.
5. It was pointed out that the legal forums being used, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the International Criminal Court (ICC), are problematic because these spaces reflect global power structures. For instance, African leaders have mostly been tried at the ICC, while Western leaders have not. Support for certain actions is also very revealing. For example, Gambia’s 2019 case against Myanmar at the ICJ for its violation of the Genocide Convention in its massacres of the Rohingya was supported by Canada, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and many others; but these states have been absent in South Africa’s case against Israel.
6. Concern was expressed that time and energy might best be used in different ways because law is a tool of power and courts normally make judgments in favor of the powerful. Also, caution was urged in that international law usually circumscribes the debate and predetermines the field of action. In the case of Palestine, for instance, international law and the UN legitimized a setter colonial movement and continue to do so; plus, it clings onto the “two-state solution.” In contrast, the popular movement on the streets has moved away from this towards decolonization as the goal. Furthermore, power will often find a way to circumvent unfavorable legal rulings.
7. We considered the July 2024 ICJ advisory opinion which stated unequivocally that Israel’s occupation is illegal and infringes Palestinians’ right to self-determination. This provoked discussion surrounding how to interpret the right to self-determination, decolonization, and the right to armed resistance. They are examples of how rights are won through struggle that are then represented in law; but the law tries to institutionalize them in the most limited way possible. Recognition of the legitimacy of armed struggle in international law is the outcome of half a century of extraordinary victories of anti-colonial revolution. The crime of apartheid is the outcome of South African liberation. But even though these become enshrined in international law, they can still be ignored by the powerful.
8. We concluded by understanding international legal spaces and the UN as forums and structures created by the dominant Western capitalist powers. They are racialized, they are discriminatory, their origins are colonial. This means they are not the best forums for those from the margins. However, actors (states and peoples) are using them and are going to keep using them. So how do we understand them as potential areas of contestation, potential avenues to help struggles for justice, without seeing them as an end in themselves?
Session 3: Militarism and Violence
In this session we discussed the arms trade and military production as a visible representation of the interconnectedness of political economy, insecurity, violence, and global order. Production for the means of violence sits at the intersection of questions of state power and capitalism, patriarchy and racism, and plays a crucial role in maintaining inequality and injustice.
1. The global order has always been militarized. Historically, war preparation, including arms production, was central to imperialism and to the development of Western industrial capitalism. The relationship between the state and arms capital is therefore intimate, not separate. The United States (in its particular combination of state and capital) has disproportionate power and dominance in terms of global arms expenditure, the production of weapons, and the trade in weapons. The US military budget is almost USD $1 trillion, and it has a long history of military interventionism.
2. While bearing in mind US dominance, we also discussed the need to “transnationalize” our understanding. For instance, finance for the arms trade is increasingly coming from companies in the GCC, which are usually state-owned, setting up wholly owned subsidiaries of American companies. The free flow of capital has created a global class of militarists getting funds from the same banks and the same venture capitalists.
3. Meanwhile, Russia and China are major arms exporters with their own expansionist projects in places such as Ukraine and the South China Sea. Turkey, Brazil, and Israel are also important arms exporters. The India-Israel arms relationship is crucial to the colonizing projects in both Kashmir and Palestine. So, this means there is not only one form of imperialism. We have a series of transnational actions and practices in a state system marked by asymmetry and hierarchy.
4. Imperial connections established during the colonial period underpin some global arms trade and supply chains. For instance, in the late 1960s, when Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain became independent, it was agreed that Britain would ensure their sovereignty and security and be compensated with excessive amounts of arms purchases along the principle: “You keep us in power, we'll give you money.” Some petrodollar money is recycled through this process, thereby linking environmental violence with military violence.
5. Communities who are harmed the most are obviously those on the receiving end of the weapons directly through air strikes and the destruction of life and livelihoods. But there are also communities that suffer from the opportunity costs of weapons, i.e., what is not funded because state money is going to the military and to arms manufacturing and purchasing. These harms are always gendered, racialized, and classed. We discussed who or what is considered “the margins” in terms of global militarism. For instance, should we see Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis as constituting “the margins” because they are weaker actors in a war with Israel and the United States? All of us implicitly have an embedded hierarchy of what we consider to be “legitimate” violence and resistance, that needs always to be critically scrutinized. And most people, especially in the West, think that states are the only legitimate actors to use violence.
6. A recurring theme was the importance of not collapsing everything into one analytical category of “violence” but to make a clear distinction between violence which dominates and oppresses with violence which is self-defense and resistance. Che Guevara, for instance, argued that violence is violence; but the question is about its strategic deployment. Even within this, we need to consider the role of structural violence in oppression. For instance, in the case of Palestine, Israel uses huge amounts of direct military violence (especially since October 7, 2023) but has also imposed structural violence through its occupation, colonization, and apartheid system. Following on from this, there was a discussion about how to analyze groups such Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; to stop being fixated on questions of whether their tactics are viable because it is happening; and to refuse to discuss their use of violence until there is a discussion of the structures of oppression and the violence they are opposing.
7. We also talked about how the UN is supposed to deal with peace and security, but the UN Security Council is frequently paralyzed, how its Permanent Five Members are all big arms manufacturers and exporters, and that they are fueling conflict. Skepticism surrounded the ability to act in these forums, particularly against powers such as the United States. Furthermore, domestically, there also appears to be no political will to stand up against the arms lobby because of their power and influence. The only reason governments will act is when they are put under pressure to do so.
8. Militarism is a transnational practice, so demilitarization and disarmament must also be a transnational practice. On demilitarization, the forces of opposition are obviously not winning; perhaps the best we can hope for is to try to make things less awful. In terms of activism against the arms trade, there are two strands. First are those who focus on forcing states to adhere to their commitments to international humanitarian law and human rights in terms of weapons sales. The problem, though, with focusing on arms trade restrictions is that they are not applied to the powerful—on the P5, for instance—but on non-state actors resisting militarism. The second group is made up of direct-action activists such as dockers that refuse to load weapons headed for conflict zones and groups like Block the Boat who try to interfere in the nodes of circulation. There are also groups such as Palestine Action demonstrating at factories to stop arms from being made.
Session 4: Accelerated Extractivism, the Environment, and the Climate Crisis
“Accelerated extractivism” is embedded in global racial capitalism and drives the current over-exploitation of minerals, fossil fuels, forests, water, and land. This is leading to the destruction of our global commons and inducing the climate crisis. In this session, the group discussed the crisis and strategies which can divert our current drive towards global annihilation.
1. The first thing the group discussed was the emergency situation regarding biodiversity loss, extinction of species, and tipping points such as a Greenland Ice Sheet collapse and the full destruction of the Amazonian rainforest. It was agreed that this destruction was the result of capitalism and the nation-state system – the profit motive underpins the drive towards ever-greater energy consumption, which then drives ever-greater carbon emissions. This is all powered because of market competition and political rivalry. The hegemony of Britain and then the United States rested on coal and oil respectively – at their peak in the 1950s, their share of cumulative planetary carbon dioxide emissions stood at 60%. However, there has been an acceleration. For instance, in two years alone China has used more fossil fuels and cement than the United States used in an entire century.
2. The way knowledge around emissions is gathered and presented was criticized. In particular, the global value chain is not properly traced, i.e., the United States, Europe, and the UK have cut emissions since 1990, but that is because they outsourced emissions. There is also the necessity to consider historic emissions, per capita emissions, etc. Furthermore, emissions from the military are not typically included in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC); even though the number one emitter in the world is the Pentagon. In the life cycle of weapons production, for instance, there is extractivism, carbon emissions, and the environmental impacts of the use of the weapons and their afterlives. Green militarism is impossible because demands for demilitarization are interconnected with demands for environmental justice. But taking on militaries, particularly the US military, is more difficult than asking or forcing individuals to monitor their own carbon footprint or to recycle.
3. It was noted that the climate crisis has been securitized by NATO, the US military, and the European Union. All these actors are pumping money and resources into researching conflicts provoked by climate change and how they are going to play out across the globe. They are taking this seriously, but not in the sense of changing the West’s behavior. Their focus is how to stop “climate refugees” coming from the Global South to the Global North.
4. We spoke about how attempts at the multilateral level, such as the Kyoto Protocol, have failed because they ultimately did not serve US financial interests, industrial interests, and the fossil fuel industry. The development of carbon markets through chlorofluorocarbon emissions trading gave companies the right to pollute and to buy that right from those that would never have the industrial development options. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme, for instance, is based on buying the right to pollute, meaning that capitalism has found a way to make profit from “environmental protections.” It was pointed out that the BRICS have not offered a progressive alternative. The West and the BRICS in the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, for instance, created a “no liability” appendix writing off the climate debt and persuading Global South leaders that no reparations were needed.
5. We discussed who was impacted the most. After all, global warming is predominantly affecting the Global South: there are the huge impacts on the island states in the Caribbean, and much of Bangladesh will disappear over the next few hundred years, for instance. The “margins” would also include Indigenous groups in the West fighting against environmental destruction in their communities from extractive industries such as the Standing Rock protestors in North Dakota. We need to look at this in class terms, too. Unfortunately, we are also seeing a form of “environmental imperialism” through the outsourcing of intensified extractivism, as well as accumulation and destruction happening in the name of fighting climate change. For instance, some governments have been pushing people off their land in coastal areas under the pretext of protecting against rising sea levels, but then turning these areas into profitable fisheries, often with ties to state officials.
6. When it came to activism, a few strands and issues were identified, particularly the degrowth movement and the climate justice movement. The demand from climate justice groups is to dispense with failed emissions and offset gimmicks and to replace debt financing, such as the Just Energy Transition Partnership for South Africa. In this case, South Africa has been given USD $9.3 billion nearly entirely in hard currency loans. This means South Africa must export more to get more hard currency to repay the loan, which means more production and more energy consumption.
7. The climate justice movement has generally failed at linking its objectives with social injustices such as racial justice, Indigenous peoples, Global South feminists, LGBTQI, and organized labor. For instance, the Standing Rock protestors in North Dakota insisted they were not environment activists, they just did not want an oil pipeline coming through their community and threatening their water. There are reports of the problematic way in which climate action activists come into communities and hijack struggles for their own purposes. And when you juxtapose jobs against energy transition, jobs will always win.
8. In the absence of the destruction of capitalism, demands could be made for green technology to become a global public good. In May 2024, for instance, China was accused of having produced too many solar panels, electric vehicles, and batteries – these could be distributed for free. There was also a discussion about how to consider incentivizing capital or forcing the state to capture profits to reinvest in paying Global South countries or mineral-rich regions not to extract. Some climate activists have argued to stop legitimizing and empowering the UNFCCC process. Alternatives could be to create regional conferences, powered by a politics from below. Multilateralism from above has been ruined by historic polluter number one: the United States. But for climate justice we clearly need multilaterals. We need development finance for this. But how these ideas and strategies are perceived in the Global South needs further discussion and exploration, particularly on how to reconcile the tension between economic development, pollution, and the extraction of critical minerals. There needs to be greater emphasis on the politics of decolonization in terms of tackling climate change.
Session 5: Social Movements and Activism
Institutions, policies, and practices for regulating global interactions are also sites of continual
contestation and struggle over the distribution and governance of resources, power, and control. These take place at multiple levels: global, regional, state, and local. Social movements and activism at all three levels were a central part of each session. But in this final session, we focused specifically on ideas, movements, and alliances that offer hope for progressive coalitions.
1. The conversation started off with a discussion about the need to confront the hegemonic distinction erected between social movements on one hand and armed resistance movements on the other. Social movements are regarded as desirable and are promoted. They are sometimes even funded by government grants and private foundations. But those which are armed are called terrorist movements. It was agreed that the term “civil society” has been thoroughly co-opted by the very institutions that they were fighting. It was also noted that not all social movements are movements for social justice; they can take any form of ideological means and ends from right to left. Discussions about the use of violence loomed large. We were cognizant of the fact that decolonial movements, for instance, were never purely non-violent. It was noted that some people referred to October 7 as a “decolonial moment” that provoked widespread debate and disagreements over what constitutes legitimate and illegitimate violence.
2. The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement was invoked as containing kernels of what could constitute a “multilateralism from the margins” in that it is intersectional – the idea of cooperating across struggles. For instance, Greta Thunberg making the connections between environmental activism and Palestine activism; or Black Lives Matter and Palestinian activism. It was also recognized, though, that while global solidarity with Palestinians has grown hugely, it has been unable to stop a genocide or to stop the United States from supporting Israel. This provoked a discussion about the need to understand what is possible and likely under current conditions.
3. We circled back to trying to understand the current moment because this will have implications for multilateral social movement organizing. From the 1980s or so, the United States could dominate under a veneer of liberal institutions or rules; that is now over because of the interconnected crises humanity now faces. The War on Terror helped to securitize, police, and criminalize all activism. But there is now some push-back. For instance, when it comes to Palestine solidarity, what is being said now on campuses could not have been said 20 years ago. This is what has led to the crackdown, to trying to equate anti-Zionism with antisemitism.
4. Some urged caution in comparing the current moment with 1968 because it is a very different situation; we are in a moment characterized by 40 years of defeat, absolute imperial strength, and a lack of organizations (political, trade union, etc.). The surviving institutions of the working class are able to respond in quite impressive ways, such as dockworkers and shipworkers unions, but they are few and far between. This provoked questions such as: do we need to be more realistic about what can be achieved? Are social mobilizations only able to try to stop the worst horrors of the day? Conversely, there is a troubling sense of pessimism based on an understanding of change as being linear. In previous struggles for liberation, particularly when there has been such a massive asymmetry and power, people did not know they were winning until they had already won.
5. Injected into the discussions was also consideration of the role of memory in activism. It was noted that empire is able to constantly reconstitute itself because it relies on amnesia. For instance, in every single decade there has been instances of imperial violence perpetrated against Global South actors, so we need to understand past struggles.
6. We discussed whether states and political leaders can be regarded as activists. For instance, left governments such as Venezuela under Hugo Chávez initially did a tremendous amount of work towards social justice and to bring visibility to other struggles. But there was also a discussion over the need to consider contentious conversations about the problematic role of those that define Syria under Assad or Venezuela under Maduro as anti-imperialist, or China as being socialist.
7. We examined the examples of international initiatives such as the World Social Forum, Samir Amin and the agenda for a Fifth International, the Progressive International, and the Occupy Wall Street movement. It was acknowledged that even when the institutional manifestation has disappeared or lost momentum, many movements leave a positive trace. For instance, the “Battle of Seattle” left a trace through reform of the WTO and in accomplishing a lot of the demands of the Global South. This was achieved because there was a big social movement outside and Global South countries inside that coordinated with each other. It also came up with the language of “the 1%” that was taken up by politicians such as Bernie Sanders. A direct line can be drawn from some of the politics of Occupy Wall Street to the movement for the Inflation Reduction Act.
8. We ended by discussing utopias and the need to give materiality to what kind of liberation we want to see, even if there are disagreements with the details. The difference between strategy and tactics, such as those embodied in Che Guevara’s revolutionary writings, and his idea of “pragmatic idealism” was discussed; meaning that we need to be radical in our thinking and radical in our principles, but strategic in how to get there. The words of Oscar Wilde were invoked by one participant to remind us that: “A map of the world that does not include utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which humanity is always landing, and when humanity lands, there it looks out and seeing a better country sets sail. Progress is the realization of utopias.” We need a vision for an emancipatory future.
List of participants
1. Noha Aboueldahab, Assistant Professor of International Law, Georgetown University in Qatar
2. Abdullah Al-Arian, Associate Professor of History and Chair of International History, Georgetown University in Qatar
3. Haya Al-Noami, Assistant Professor of Race and Colonialism, Northwestern University in Qatar
4. Lisa Bhungalia, Assistant Professor of Geography and International Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison
5. Patrick Bond, Distinguished Professor, University of Johannesburg Department of Sociology
6. Omar Dahi, Professor of Economics, Hampshire College, and Director of Security in Context
7. Gareth Dale, Reader in Political Economy and Associate Head of the Department of Social and Political Sciences, Brunel University London
8. Aude Darnal, Research Analyst and Project Manager, Stimson Center’s Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program
9. Firat Demir, Professor of Economics, University of Oklahoma
10. Sai Englert, Assistant Professor, Leiden University
11. Bassam Haddad, Associate Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University
12. Sami Hermez, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Northwestern University in Qatar
13. Amy Niang, Associate Professor in Political Science, The Africa Institute, Sharjah
14. Ammar Shmeileh, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
15. Anna Stavrianakis, Professor of International Relations, University of Sussex, and Director of Research and Strategies at Shadow World Investigations
16. Mandy Turner, Senior Researcher with Security in Context and Visiting Senior Fellow at the International State Crime Initiative-Queen Mary University of London
17. Alejandro Velasco, Associate Professor of Latin American History, New York University
Security in Context (SiC) is an interdisciplinary network of scholars who research conflict, security and development from a critical and Global South perspective. The Institute for Advanced Study in the Global South at NU-Q (#IAS_NUQ) produces and promotes evidence-based storytelling focused on the histories, cultures, societies, and media of the Global South. The roundtable was organized by Omar Dahi, Sami Hermez, and Mandy Turner. This report was written by Mandy Turner.
