This article first appeared in the SiC Report “The Global South in an Era of Great Power Competition. Click here to access the introduction and a full pdf download of the Report.
By Aude Darnal
Abstract: The current world order is a failure for the majority of the planet. It was never designed to foster prosperity for all, but rather to advance the interests of a minority: the West. Demands for its reform and that of its institutions have existed since the decolonization movements. Today, as Global South countries are the most vulnerable to climate, debt, food, energy, and other fragilizing crises, they are using their rising power and cooperation to translate these demands into reality. But the United States, which holds immense power in the negotiation of a new world order, views this challenge through the prism of great power competition. U.S. primary adversaries ― China and Russia ― are the driving force behind criticism of the international order, the trope says, and against their attempt to manipulate the Global South, favor chaos and bring down the West, the United States must stand stronger than ever to maintain its primacy, or even supremacy, over the world. This conventional stance is dangerous for international stability and threatens Global South countries’ aspirations for sustainable prosperity and security. It must be challenged.
“We face neither East nor West: We face forward.”
– Kwame Nkrumah, First Prime Minister and President of Ghana
Introduction
Recent global crises have highlighted the long-standing and entrenched structural and systemic limitations of the international order — particularly those that affect Global South countries, which have been historically excluded from global decision-making processes.1 This inequity has led to a crisis of legitimacy for the Western-led order and its institutions, and Global South countries are increasingly calling out the failure of the United States and the West to build a world order that benefits all. Political leaders and thinkers across the Majority World (aka the Global South) continue to press the international community’s most powerful states to support an overhaul of global governance, as they simultaneously seek new strategic and pragmatic partnerships that better advance their interests.2 These efforts include alternative models of cooperation with the West’s adversaries, deepened South-South cooperation to address common challenges, and attempts to foster more balanced partnerships and negotiate new rules with their traditional Western state partners and multilateral organizations.3
On the other hand, despite growing worldwide condemnation of the current system’s illegitimacy and wider recognition of the shortcomings of the Western-centered world order in Washington, political discussions in the country remain nonetheless dominated by the view that the United States must maintain its primacy ― if not supremacy ― over global governance. Supporters of this view argue that the United States must define and direct any transformation of the international system to prevent the world from plunging into complete disorder and lawlessness.4 This approach to American global responsibility is one of the foundations of great power competition, which currently drives U.S. foreign policy. In their attempts to counter China’s continuing rise and Russia’s international aspirations, U.S. officials have advanced a strategy that focuses more on reacting to their country’s adversaries in a bid to maintain U.S. supremacy, than on fostering strategic cooperation to advance prosperity and security for all. In addition to increasingly militarizing its foreign policy, the Biden administration juggles sporadic attempts to strengthen its relations with Global South countries and superficial concessions ― such as the equiproportional rise of the IMF vote quotas ― that ultimately maintain the status quo in global governance.5
Western powers’ self-importance, and their obsession with performing as the international system’s sole architect, leader, and police force, are problematic and increasingly divorced from reality.6 Transformation to achieve a non-Western-centered or dominated global order — one that is consequently more equitable and able to address common challenges — is well underway, though there is no consensus on the parameters of change, even in the Global South. The world does not need the West to take the lead in this endeavor. But if the West — and the United States in particular — are unable to change their worldview, adapt it to new realities, and support positive change through concrete actions, they will feed into the fragmentation and polarization of the world.7 Ultimately, this fragmenting will impede collective action and stymie opportunities for addressing global crises, including pandemics, climate, political and economic refugee and migrant flows, and drug and weapons trafficking, which have a destabilizing impact in both the West and the Global South.8
To rethink the world order we must look beyond the reductive lens of great power competition. This essay focuses on what drivers of change animate Global South countries, and what the reform of the world order entails, to set up the necessary foundations to achieve positive change.
The current international system: Whose rules and for what order?
Calls from the Majority World to redefine international rules are a matter of survival and human security for many. However, in the West, they are primarily received and analyzed through the prism of great power competition with China and Russia, which leads policymakers to flawed and misleading reasonings that hamper efforts to achieve positive change.
Reason #1: The West’s skewed perception of the Global South’s role in the world order
Policy leaders in the West tend to associate calls for a restructuring of the world order with advancing Chinese and Russian interests, thus dismissing the vast majority of Global South countries’ demands and concerns. U.S. officials, for instance, have repeatedly hammered the importance of the United States and its democratic allies in preserving the rules-based order against its presumed enemies.9 The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) affirms that “[The United States is] in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order” and identifies China and Russia as the primary threats to this rules-based order.10
Against the backdrop of great power competition, Western powers often dismiss the shortcomings of the international system―and therefore, Global South countries’ demands for more equity―and their own role in its failure. Instead, they frame the future of the world order as a struggle between the West on the one hand, and China, Russia, and their autocratic partners on the other, and regularly warn Global South nations of their risk of being influenced or instrumentalized by U.S. adversaries.11 By viewing Global South nations as passive agents that are tacitly content with the global system, Western powers reduce them to pawns of either the West or the East (China and Russia), with no interests, agency, or capacity to assert their sovereignty. This reduction contributes to a lack of strategic empathy and feeds misunderstanding of these nations in the West.12
Reason #2: Resistance to reckoning with the Western order’s failures
Although the “rules-based international order” implies universality, in practice, it is not. The United States — and its most powerful Western allies — regularly bend such rules or turn a blind eye to others’ violations of them to protect and advance their perceived interests. Such hypocrisy has further eroded the legitimacy of the international order and the West’s attempts to remain the leader in its transformation.13 The United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, its refusal to sign international treaties such as the Convention on Cluster Munitions, or, more recently, the Biden Administration’s attempt to protect its largest military drone base by refusing to call the coup in Niger a coup, are all illustrative of U.S. double standards when it comes to enforcing a real rules-based order.14 European powers have also challenged these rules, such as during NATO’s war in Libya in 2011 or when France tacitly approved the 2022 “soft coup” in Chad by Mahamat Déby following the death of his father, late President Idriss Déby.15 Simultaneously, these powerful actors continue to impose the international rules they created on others without following the rules themselves, sustaining what South African expert Tim Murithi calls an “order of oppression,” rather than a rules-based order.16
The war in Ukraine has further shined a spotlight on the West’s double standards. The pressure the pro-Ukraine Western front exerted at the United Nations on Global South leaders who did not support Ukraine was met with firm resistance and terse reminders of the West’s repeated disregard for crises in the Global South. In response to European criticism of his country’s position on the war in Ukraine, India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar scolded that “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.”17
For now, such warnings fall mostly on deaf ears, as leading U.S. scholars cling to a binary "with us or against us" frame of reference. For example, Princeton’s John Ikenberry claims that “The United States defends an international order it has led for three-quarters of a century…China and Russia seek an international order that dethrones Western liberal values — one that is more hospitable to regional blocs, spheres of influence, and autocracy.”18 Such fear-based narratives overlook how the current U.S.-led system has fostered inequalities, marginalized the majority of the world’s nations, and indirectly hampered powerful Western states’ national security. Worse, these stances undermine any discussions about alternatives that are neither Western- nor Eastern-centered.
Drivers of change towards a new world order
Recent months have highlighted a notable change in the Biden administration’s tone on multilateral organizations, as many U.S. officials have expressed their support for changes to multilateral institutions.19 Despite this shift in tone, however, there is no evidence of tangible results, such as specific and meaningful global reform proposals that go beyond cosmetic changes. Moreover, U.S. policy circles approach the details of a major transformation of the international system with significant caution, often justifying their reticence with the fear that U.S. adversaries may capitalize on such a transformation.20 While an expansive definition of U.S. national security and interests produces anxiety; any alternative to the U.S.-led order is seen as a threat to the United States.
As a result, the prevailing worldview in Washington is that the international community has a choice between a “good” Western values-led system, versus a “bad” Eastern autocratic disorder. This viewpoint is illustrated by the characterization of non-Western initiatives to foster change — as displayed during the BRICS Summit — as “anti-Western.”21 Additionally, although U.S. officials may be more vocal about their support for reform, their analytical framework is still founded on the view that U.S. supremacy over the international system is the unique and ultimate solution to any challenge. This perspective, however, fundamentally contradicts Global South’s calls for an alternative model of global governance and further defeats the purpose of transformation. What, then, are the primary drivers of change in the current context?
If the world is to have rules, all must adhere
Prominent narratives presuppose that reforming the international system would entail undermining rules and order: an assumption that hinges on the idea that these rules and norms — human rights, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the rule of law — are inherently Western. Such a perspective dismisses the Global South’s historical contributions to these norms and values, which existed across the world long before Western imperialism.22 For instance, in the 13th century, the Mandingo Empire in West Africa birthed the Manden Charter, which advocated for “social peace in diversity, the inviolability of the human being, education, the integrity of the motherland, food security, the abolition of slavery by razzia (or raid), and freedom of expression and trade.”23 In the Middle East, as far back as the 6th century BCE, text found on the Cyrus cylinder championed religious freedom, racial equality, and autonomous choice for all.24 Similarly, China’s 5th century BCE Zhou Dynasty and the Mayan civilization had both integrated values centered around human prosperity into their governance.25
To be sure, the Western-led colonial era disrupted development in all these regions, and today, virtually all countries subject to such colonization grapple with its lingering effects, including poor governance, weak institutional foundations, and human rights violations by state actors. But the failure of some political leaders to protect or advance international norms should not be used as grounds for dismissing their populations’ adherence to and aspirations for such rules; doing so marginalizes entire nations from taking part in discussions on the reform of the world order.26 The West does not maintain a monopoly over universal human values, so it is only fair that it does not retain unchecked control over international rules and values in perpetuity.
Although some governments in the Global South may be pursuing national security strategies that pose a threat to regional and global security, most are committed to making the order more durable and equitable. Their advocacy for change does not contradict international rules but rather strengthens the principle of universality. Thus, their vision of reform is primarily about fostering a more stable and secure world for all that is based on a more legitimate world order. Most Global South national agendas are not aimed at punishing or weakening the West, nor are they focused on inviting disorder.
Strengthen multilateralism by reforming inequitable and unfair rules
Another major point of contention in this transformation is the historical sidelining of Global South countries in decision-making processes, despite the current order purportedly being based on multilateralism. International rules are defined by and centered around a minority. The current models of international governance — from the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions — are outdated. The system was established by colonial powers following World War II, a time when most of the Global south had not even begun decolonization.
The refusal of Western powers to facilitate a restructuring of the order, especially since the end of the Cold War over 30 years ago, has led to an accumulation of mutually reinforcing grievances primarily centered around the order’s unfairness to the Majority World. Among the most salient cases of this refusal is the underrepresentation of Global South countries in multilateral organizations. Whether questioning the UN Security Council’s permanent membership policies or quotas and vote share at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these important bodies adopt policies that disregard Global South countries’ interests, and rely on faulty assumptions about their needs, perpetuating inequitable practices. These inequities include exorbitant interest on debts and constrained international financing flows to the Global South nations that urgently need to address climate change and foster development.27
Additionally, systemic marginalization by foreign actors (donor countries, international organizations, and international NGOs) of local actors (academic, civil society organizations, and other economic stakeholders) continues throughout the lifecycles of peacebuilding and development programs and other economic reform processes. As a 2022 Peace Direct report argues, “too often, [partnerships] are exploitative and transactional, undermining local actors’ value, agency and dignity and reinforcing colonial power imbalances. Not only does this impact Global South practitioners, but it undermines the sustainability of peacebuilding, development and humanitarian efforts.”28 These imbalanced, often predatory, dynamics help sustain neocolonial structures and need to be upended.29 While certain initiatives, like the strengthening localization movement in the development sector, reckon with these harmful and counterproductive dynamics, archaic practices endure. According to a 2022 CSIS report, in 2020, “the percentage of [humanitarian] funding to local and national actors sat at a mere 3.1 percent,” leaving most funding in the hands of international NGOs.30
The need for a reform of the international order goes beyond international organizations, international assistance and development. It is critical to also look at bilateral and multilateral treaties and domestic policies that maintain inequitable and abusive clauses rooted in long-held biases against Global South countries.31
To be sure, as South-South cooperation increases — whether through regional organizations, groups like BRICS, or foreign direct investment — it will be crucial to monitor Global South countries’ actions. Power hierarchies will persist, but a greater commitment by the most powerful actors across the planet can help prevent abusive practices.
Conclusion
It is clear that the world order created by the West only works for a handful of states and is illegitimate. Yet, when it comes to advancing practical changes to the international system, there remains strong reluctance in the West. U.S. leaders’ opposition to recalibrating IMF quotas, which impact voting power, is a case in point, showing that they continue to resist a more balanced power distribution within the institution at large.32
Worsening global crises call for an urgent and radical rethinking of global governance, but this endeavor should not focus just on the Global South. It is also in the West’s interest to challenge the structures of power and domination that foster inequities and inequalities in the most vulnerable countries. The effort to reform the international system is not simply an advancement of human-centered development; it is a matter of global security, stability, and sustainability.33 Reform is of critical interest for both Global South nations and their Western or Eastern counterparts alike.34 As I wrote elsewhere, “through the processes and dynamics of regionalization and globalization, [crises in the Global South]…often hamper major powers’ interests, national security and human and economic prosperity.”35
Reform would be beneficial for the West if it buys in, as it would help address the root causes driving instability factors such as climate, economic, and other political refugee flows, particularly as governments face increasing pressure induced by nationalist and far-right movements, which have, in some cases, translated into domestic violent extremism. As such, it is shortsighted for and detrimental to the West to ignore or consider as anti-Western the frustration and resentment that decades of double standards and inequitable international rules have produced beyond their own borders. It is contrary to Western interests to pursue purely cosmetic changes in the international arena that do not truly enable more equitable international rules. Such behavior will only further drive away Global South countries — many of which have demonstrated their strategic pragmatism by collaborating with China and Russia on common interests and by remaining cautious about their traditional partners’ political instability, such as the United States.
There are several avenues to ensure that the restructuring of the world order brings about positive change. These include reforming laws, creating new equitable structures, leveraging international political groups, strengthening regional organizations, and deepening South-South cooperation. Though study of these particular dynamics is beyond the scope of this paper, it is safe to say that change is already underway. As a prominent political leader recently told me, “The world can change, but for this to happen, the United States also needs to change.” As this paper emphasizes, that does not mean that the United States must dominate the reform process but rather that it actively supports a profound overhaul of the U.S. and its Western allies’ worldview, and reckons with the fact that even the most powerful states are not protected from the dire consequences of an unfair international order.
For this overhaul to happen, it is crucial to elevate voices from the Global South — their experiences, knowledge, and expertise — particularly in major policy centers.36 This elevation will introduce radically different narratives that will help stakeholders formulate, negotiate, and implement concrete strategies for a successful international system for the majority, if not for all.
Footnotes
1: To read more about the concept of the Global South, see: Aude Darnal, “The ‘Global South’ Is Real. Deal With It,” World Politics Review, September 28, 2023, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/global-south-countries-term-brics/.
2: The label “Majority World” is used to describe the Global South. See: “Concepts of the Global South,” University of Cologne - Global South Studies Center, September 7, 2023, https://gssc.uni-koeln.de/en/wissenstransfer/voices-from-around-the-world/concepts-of-the-global-south;
Michael Sheldrick, “Mottley, Ruto And Macron Take Center Stage At The Global Financing Pact Summit,” Forbes, June 26, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/globalcitizen/2023/06/26/
mottley-ruto-and-macron-take-center-stage-at-the-global-financing-pact-summit/.
3: Dima Al-Khatib, “South-South Cooperation Day 2023,” September 12, 2023, https://unsouthsouth.org/south-south-cooperation-day-2023/;
Earl Carr, “China’s Engagement In The Caribbean And The United States’ Response,” Forbes, January 27, 2023,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/earlcarr/2023/01/27/chinas-engagement-in-the-caribbean-and-the-united-states-response/?sh=1be9bf94ac3f;
Avinash Persaud, “The Climate Crisis Is Expensive -- Here’s Who Should Pay for It,” https://www.ted.com/talks/avinash_persaud_the_climate_crisis_is_expensive_here_s_who_should_pay_for_it.
4: Matthew Kaminski, “America in Decline? World Thinks Again.,” POLITICO, January 20, 2023,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/01/20/us-davos-ukraine-00078771.
5: Shambaugh, Jay. “Remarks at the Center for Global Development on the IMF and Support for Developing Countries by Under Secretary
for International Affairs Jay Shambaugh.” U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 14, 2023. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1715.
6: Rich Lowry, “‘The Case for American Power: Why We Must Lead the Free World,’” National Review, May 9, 2022,
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-case-for-american-power-why-we-must-lead-the-free-world/.
7: Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “Last Best Hope: The West’s Final Chance to Build a Better World Order,” Foreign Affairs, June 21, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/last-best-hope-better-world-order-west.
8: “Migrants, Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Immigrants: What’s the Difference?,” International Rescue Committee (blog), July 13, 2022, https://www.rescue.org/article/migrants-asylum-seekers-refugees-and-immigrants-whats-difference.
9: Daalder and Lindsay, “Last Best Hope: The West’s Final Chance to Build a Better World Order;” Peter Beinart, “Opinion |
The Vacuous Phrase at the Core of Biden’s Foreign Policy,” The New York Times, June 22, 2021, sec. Opinion,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/22/opinion/biden-foreign-policy.html; David Rennie, “China Wants to Change, or Break, a World Order Set by Others,”
The Economist, October 10, 2022, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2022/10/10/china-wants-to-change-or-break-a-world-order-set-by-others.
10: Joseph R. Biden Jr., “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: White House, October 2022),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf;
Ben Scott, “Rules-Based Order: What’s in a Name?,” The Interpreter, June 30, 2021,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rules-based-order-what-s-name.
11: For examples of this tendency, see:
Chaguan, “China Wants to Be the Leader of the Global South,” The Economist, September 21, 2023,
https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/21/china-wants-to-be-the-leader-of-the-global-south.
Dov S. Zakheim, “BRICS Expansion Is All about China,” The Hill, September 1, 2023,
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4181614-brics-expansion-is-all-about-china/.
12: For examples of this tendency, see:
Chaguan, “China Wants to Be the Leader of the Global South,” The Economist, September 21, 2023,
https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/21/china-wants-to-be-the-leader-of-the-global-south.
Dov S. Zakheim, “BRICS Expansion Is All about China,” The Hill, September 1, 2023,
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4181614-brics-expansion-is-all-about-china/.
13: Tim Murithi, “Order of Oppression: Africa’s Quest for a New International System,” Foreign Affairs, April 18, 2023,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/africa/global-south-un-order-oppression.
14: Aude Darnal, “It’s Time for the U.S. to End the War on Terror,” World Politics Review, August 7, 2023,
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/us-war-on-terrorism-military-africa-afghanistan-foreign-policy/;
Nick Turse, “When Is a Coup Not a Coup? When the U.S. Says So.,” The Intercept, August 19, 2023,
https://theintercept.com/2023/08/19/niger-coup-us-military-assistance/.
15: Katie Nodjimbadem, “Chad’s Coup Leader Stops Democracy in Its Tracks,” Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/06/chad-deby-coup-leader-democracy/.
16: Murithi, “Order of Oppression: Africa’s Quest for a New International System.”
17: S Jaishankar, Europe has to grow out of mindset that its problems are world’s problems: Jaishankar : The Tribune India, June 3, 2022, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/europe-has-to-grow-out-of-mindset-that-its-problems-are-worlds-problems-jaishankar-400709.
18: G. John Ikenberry, “Why American Power Endures,” Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2022,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/why-american-power-endures-us-led-order-isnt-in-decline-g-john-ikenberry.
19: President Biden and the United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai both affirmed their country’s commitment to reform multilateral institutions on the margins of the UN General Assembly. See: Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Remarks by President Biden Before the 78th Session of the United Nations General Assembly | New York, NY” (78th UN General Assembly, New York, NY, September 19, 2023),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/09/19/
remarks-by-president-biden-before-the-78th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/.
20: Hal Brands, “The Global South Owes America Some Thanks,” Bloomberg, April 27, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-04-27/the-global-south-owes-america-some-thanks.
21: Robert Dixon and Christian Shepherd, “BRICS Summit Seen by Russia and China as Anti-Western Alliance - The Washington Post,” The Washington Post, August 23, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/23/brics-summit-putin-xi-russia/.
22: Jean-David Levitte, “With the End of Four Centuries of Western Dominance, What Will the World Order Be in the 21st Century?,” Brookings.https://www.brookings.edu/articles/with-the-end-of-four-centuries-of-western-dominance-what-will-the-world-order-be-in-the-21st-century/.
23: “UNESCO - Manden.Kurukan Fuga,” accessed September 19, 2023, https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/manden-charter-proclaimed-in-kurukan-fuga-00290.
24: “Replica of ‘Edict of Cyrus’ | United Nations Gifts,” accessed September 19, 2023, https://www.un.org/ungifts/replica-edict-cyrus.
25: Chris Fraser, “Mohism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2023),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/mohism/; Qianfan Zhang, “Equality and Universal Love: Human Dignity in Mohism,”
in Human Dignity in Classical Chinese Philosophy: Confucianism, Mohism, and Daoism, ed. Qianfan Zhang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016),
143–72, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-70920-5_5; Beverly S. Faircloth, Laura M. Gonzalez, and Katherine Ramos,
Resisting Barriers to Belonging: Conceptual Critique and Critical Applications (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021),
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=FedFEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=
in+lak%27ech+human+rights&ots=
dSE70TqkSi&sig=hikwIxQJM6tM4zNyAQj17PvVENE#v=onepage&q=in%20lak'ech&f=false.
26: This is illustrated by the existence of vibrant civil societies that strive to hold political leaders accountable, advance human rights, and promote economic prosperity, all throughout the modern-day Global South.
27: United Nations, “A World of Debt | A Growing Burden to Global Prosperity,” UN Global Crisis Response Group, July 12, 2023,
https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt; Persaud, “The Climate Crisis Is Expensive -- Here’s Who Should Pay for It;” 20230622 Mottley at Paris Summit, 2023, .https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=74AnmWmtpEs; The Bridgetown Initiative is a proposal developed by the government of Barbados to unlock climate and development financing for emerging economies through practical reform of international financing institutions. See: “The 2022 Bridgetown Initiative,” September 23, 2022, https://pmo.gov.bb/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/The-2022-Bridgetown-Initiative.pdf; Avinash Persaud, “Unblocking the Green Transformation in Developing Countries with a Partial Foreign Exchange Guarantee.,” Climate Policy Initiative, June 7, 2023, https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/
wp-content/uploads/2023/06/An-FX-Guarantee-Mechanism-for-the-Green-Transformation-in-Developing-Countries.pdf.
28: Dylan Mathews, Raaval Bains, and Dimitri Kotsiras, “Transforming Partnerships in International Cooperation” (Peace Direct, September 20, 2023), https://www.peacedirect.org/transforming-partnerships/.
29: Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “Five Reasons Donors Give for Not Funding Local NGOs Directly | Working in Development,” The Guardian, November 9, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/
2015/nov/09/five-reasons-donors-give-for-not-funding-local-ngos-directly.
30: Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Jacob Kurtzer, and Hareem Fatima Abdullah, “Localizing Humanitarian Action in Africa” (Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 27, 2022), https://www.csis.org/analysis/localizing-humanitarian-action-africa.
31: See for example the current Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) claim launched by US company Honduras Próspera against Honduras under the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement. The ISDS system is rooted in history and colonization and affect inter-state engagement to the detriment of the vast majority of Global South states and actors. See:
Elizabeth Warren and Lloyd Doggett to Katherine Tai and Antony J. Blinken, “Letter to Tai, Blinken Re Elimination of ISDS,” May 2, 2023, https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
2023.05.02%20Letter%20to%20Tai,%20Blinken%20re%20elimination%20of%20ISDS.pdf.
Sarah Lazare, “How Biden Can End Secretive Corporate Tribunals,” The American Prospect, February 2, 2023, https://prospect.org/api/content/
415881dc-a28a-11ed-84ab-12b3f1b64877/.
Lauge N Skovgaard and Geoffrey Gertz, “Reforming the Investment Treaty Regime” (Chatham House, March 10, 2021), https://www.chatThahamhouse.org/sites/default/files/
2021-03/2021-03-10-reforming-investment-treaty-regime-poulsen-gertz.pdf.
32: Jay Shambaugh, “Remarks at the Center for Global Development on the IMF and Support for Developing Countries by Under Secretary for International Affairs Jay Shambaugh,” https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1715.
33: Narendra Modi, “PM’s Remarks at Opening Session of Voice of Global South Summit 2023” (Speech, Voices of the Global South Summit 2023, Virtual, January 12, 2023), https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/
pms-remarks-at-opening-session-of-voice-of-global-south-summit-2023/.
34: Stephen M. Walt, “China Wants a ‘Rules-Based International Order,’ Too,” Foreign Policy, March 31, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/
2021/03/31/china-wants-a-rules-based-international-order-too/.
35: Darnal, “The ‘Global South’ Is Real. Deal With It.”
36: Aude Darnal, “The Global South in the World Order • Grand Strategy Research,” Stimson Center, https://www.stimson.org/project/global-south/.
Aude Darnal is a Research Analyst and Project Manager in the Stimson Center’s Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program. She is the founder and leader of the Global South in the World Order Project, which seeks to elevate perspectives from the Global South countries on international affairs and global governance and question prevailing assumptions about these stakeholders to promote new and equitable partnerships between them and Western powers, in a period of profound changes in international power dynamics. Her primary field of research has been in the peacebuilding and development sector, and she has worked in West Africa. She notably advocates for a wholesale restructuring of the current models for international assistance and responses to security crises and a rebalance of the global governance system.
