This article first appeared in the SiC Report “Rethinking Insecurity in the Blue Pacific Region.“ Click here to access the introduction and a full PDF download of the Report.
By Edward Hunt
Edward Hunt writes about war and empire. He has a PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary.
Abstract: While the leaders of the United States call for a free and open Indo-Pacific, they are ruling over an oceanic empire in the central Pacific Ocean. The U.S. oceanic empire runs through the compact states, which are Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. The empire is distinguished by three features: 1) it is large, as it is comparable in size to the continentalUnited States, 2) it is illegal, with limits on the sovereignty of the compact states and disregard for the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, and 3) it is permanent, on account of U.S. claims to military controls that exist in perpetuity. By administering a large, illegal, and permanent oceanic empire, the United States poses a major obstacle to a rules-based international system and the freedom of the people of the compact states.
Introduction
The United States is maintaining a large and illegal oceanic empire in the central Pacific Ocean.1 The U.S. oceanic empire is organized around the compact states, which are Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Together, these three large ocean states range across a vast oceanic area that is comparable in size to the continental United States and form what U.S. officials call a “strategic bridge,” which integrates U.S. military sites across the Pacific Ocean. “We control essentially the northern half of the Pacific between Hawaii and [the] Philippines,” U.S. diplomat Joseph Yun stated in 2023.2
The United States controls the compact states through a system of neocolonialism. This system, which I have called “compact colonialism,”3 is based on a special arrangement between the United States and each compact state called a compact of free association.4 Under the compacts, the United States provides the compact states’ citizens economic assistance and visa-free access to the United States in exchange for U.S. military controls over their countries. Now that the United States is renewing economic provisions of the compacts, it is reinforcing its system of compact colonialism. “The underlying item in the compact is our ability to control access to the land, the sea, and air of these countries,” Yun explained. “As long as we have compacts, we do not let anyone else [we don’t like] access [them]. And that’s the key, I believe.”5
The U.S. oceanic empire is inconsistent with stated U.S. goals for the Pacific Ocean. While officials in Washington insist that they are trying to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific in a rules-based international order, they are upholding a closed imperial system that defies international law. By claiming the right to exclude third parties from the compact states’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs), U.S. officials are flouting international law. U.S. claims about the permanence of U.S. powers undermine the sovereignty of the compact states. What this paper shows, in short, is that U.S. officials are maintaining a large, illegal, and permanent oceanic empire; they have gotten away with it for decades, and they intend to continue doing so in the year ahead.
Background
The U.S. oceanic empire in the central Pacific Ocean is a major component of the global American empire. It combines two imperial systems, the first of which is a system of colonial rule in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, both of which are U.S. territories. Guam is a major hub of U.S. military operations in the region. The second is a system of neocolonial rule in the compact states. While U.S. officials portray the compact states as sovereign states, they administer them as if they are colonies. When grouped together, the colonies and the compact states form a large interconnected oceanic region that is larger than most countries. “Most of the oceans in these islands either belong to Palau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, or us, through Guam and the Northern Marianas,” Yun asserted.6
The compact states occupy a unique position in the American empire. Under the compacts, the United States maintains several neocolonial controls over the islands and their peoples.7 Officials in Washington approve the terms of the compacts, set the requirements for economic assistance, and control the islands’ defenses. Although the compact states are members of the United Nations, they function as U.S. proxies; on votes before the General Assembly, for instance, U.S. officials instruct compact leaders how to vote.8 Privately, compact leaders acknowledge the limitations to their sovereignty. “A good part of Palau’s sovereignty has been given to the United States,” a Palauan diplomat told a U.S. official in 2009. “No modern, normative international law would allow this.”9
U.S. military controls also severely limit the sovereignty of the compact states. One such control is what U.S. officials call “the defense veto,” which deters the compact states from creating diplomatic arrangements that would balance or counter U.S. military dominance of the central Pacific Ocean. Faced with the possibility of the United States blocking their diplomatic efforts, compact leaders have never joined the Treaty of Rarotonga, which is the legal framework for the region’s nuclear free zone. If compact leaders ever ratified the treaty, then they would have to impose strict limitations on U.S. nuclear operations in the region.10
U.S. officials also tout what they call “the right of strategic denial.” With this alleged right, U.S. officials claim the power to exclude third parties from the compact states. The United States flaunts this power to deter other countries from accessing the area, as any country that challenges U.S. claims puts itself at risk. “We have full responsibility and authority for security and defense matters in or relating to these three countries,” State Department official Mark Lambert told Congress in 2022. “We can deny other countries’ militaries access to the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Palau.”11
While the compact states endure these impositions on their sovereignty, they receive special benefits from the United States. One is economic assistance, which enables the compact states to fund their governments. Without regular U.S. payments, the compact governments would struggle to function, as they are dependent on U.S. assistance. In addition, the United States provides islanders with visa-free access to the United States. Today, an estimated 94,000 islanders are living in the United States, nearly half the combined population of all three compact states.12 Despite the fact that many compact migrants struggle to make a living in the United States, U.S. officials believe that their presence strengthens ties between the United States and the islands. “They are very, very American,” Yun said, referring to compact migrants. “To me, this is [a] huge asset for the United States, and it needs to remain as an asset.”13
Many compact leaders welcome the special relationship with the United States. In recent years, compact leaders have insisted that their countries are part of the U.S. homeland. “The U.S regards our country as part of the homeland and we regard ourselves as part of the homeland because of the special treaty that we have which is called the compact,” FSM President David Panuelo said in 2022.14 When compact leaders met with Secretary of State Antony Blinken that same year, Panuelo and Palauan President Surangel Whipps described their countries as “part of the homeland.”15
Regardless, most people in the compact states remain far more concerned about their livelihoods than their national allegiance. Following decades of U.S. humanitarian indifference, islanders struggle to make a living. Average income and wealth in the compact states is much lower than it is in the U.S. states and territories. Many islanders leave their countries for the United States.16
For the people of the Marshall Islands, a major concern is the ongoing effects of U.S. nuclear testing. From 1946 to 1958, the United States detonated 67 nuclear bombs in the Marshall Islands, incinerating entire islands and leaving others contaminated with radioactive materials. No matter how many times islanders have requested additional assistance, most officials in Washington have brushed them aside, insisting that the matter was settled long ago.17
Perhaps islanders’ top concern is climate change. As representatives in the Pacific Islands Forum announced in the 2018 Boe Declaration, climate change is “the single greatest threat” to the people of the Pacific Islands.18 All three compact states face an existential threat from rising sea levels. Given the possibility that many islands may become uninhabitable in the near future, compact leaders have been calling on the world to do more to address the climate crisis. “The issue they really want addressed and given some prominence is of course climate change because this area suffers from climate change like no other area,” Yun acknowledged.19
Recent Developments
While U.S. officials acknowledge that climate change poses a major threat to the islands, their priority is preserving the U.S. oceanic empire. Currently, U.S. officials are renewing economic provisions of the compacts that had been set to expire in 2023 for the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia and in 2024 for Palau. The United States is providing more than $7 billion in additional funding over the next two decades. Marshallese negotiators have been skeptical of U.S. proposals, especially as they concern the U.S. nuclear legacy, but relentless U.S. pressure has undermined Marshallese resistance, enabling Congress to move forward with terms developed by the Biden administration.20
U.S. officials defend the cash-for-access arrangement by insisting that the compact states are strategically important. When the Biden administration sent Congress its legislative proposal for renewing economic provisions of the compacts, it claimed that the United States can use the compact states to maintain a direct connection between Hawaii and East Asia. “Together, these three countries form a strategic bridge that stretches from Hawaii to the Philippines, an area that is geographically larger than the continental United States,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of the Interior Deb Haaland explained in a letter to Congress. “We can deny other countries’ militaries access to FSM, RMI, and Palau.”21
By renewing economic provisions, U.S. officials also hope to minimize any controversies over the ongoing U.S. military presence in the region. Although there is some debate over the extent to which the U.S. military values the compact states, especially given the fact that the United States destroyed several atolls in the Marshall Islands during its years of nuclear testing, officials in Washington hope to preserve several U.S. military facilities in the area. One is a missile testing site in the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, where the United States tests hypersonic missiles. Another is a site in Palau, where the U.S. military is building an advanced radar station. More generally, U.S. officials view the main benefit of renewing economic provisions as the preservation of exclusive U.S. access to the region. “The total cost is likely to be a fraction of current U.S. annual defense spending but will provide unparalleled access to a region that is crucially important to the security of the United States and its allies and partners in the Pacific,” former U.S. Ambassador to Palau John Hennessey-Niland argued in 2023.22
In fact, the United States has spent the past fifteen years reinforcing its security presence in the region. By creating special arrangements with the compact states called “shiprider agreements,” the United States has acquired the power to police the compact states’ exclusive economic zones, which extend up to 200 nautical miles around each island. These arrangements are based on the notion that the United States can patrol the zones as long as officials from the compact states are riding on U.S. vessels or providing them with jurisdiction. The U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy have been patrolling the compact states’ large oceanic areas with the stated goal of deterring illegal fishing.23
U.S. officials say that U.S.-led security operations safeguard a free and open Indo-Pacific, but what they are really doing is maintaining a closed imperial system. They want to exclude other parties from the area. As Yun explained in 2023, the United States is maintaining a fence around the region to keep it under U.S. control. “In any kind of competition with China… it is crucial that we… continue to make sure that we have a fence that we can defend,” Yun said. With this kind of fence in place, the United States “can project force” and secure “basing rights as well as strategic denial rights.”24
A2/AD, Compact Style
U.S. officials insist that they maintain special privileges under the compacts, but they repeatedly overstate the scope of these privileges. One of their most audacious claims concerns the alleged right of strategic denial. When they cite language in the compacts that grants the United States the authority to foreclose access to the compact states by third parties, U.S. officials interpret the language to mean that the United States can bar third parties from the compact states’ exclusive economic zones. With this interpretation, U.S. officials claim to control a contiguous oceanic area that is larger than the continental United States, just as Blinken and Haaland did in their letter to Congress.
The notion that the United States controls such a vast oceanic area is deeply ingrained in the minds of many U.S. officials. Even members of Congress who are sympathetic to the concerns of the Marshallese people about the ongoing effects of U.S. nuclear testing remain convinced that the United States remains in charge of the compact states. The compacts “give the United States control over an area of the Pacific Ocean the size of the continental United States,” several members of Congress explained in a 2022 press release.25 Not only was their statement considered to be so uncontroversial that it received no media attention, but there was similar media silence when former State Department official Rose Gottemoeller made a nearly word-for-word assertion shortly thereafter, when she claimed that the compacts “give the US control over an area of the Pacific the size of the continental United States.”26
During formal discussions about U.S. policy in the compact states, U.S. officials often express the same imperial logic. At a 2023 congressional hearing, U.S. Senator John Barrasso boasted that the United States can “deny access to any potential adversary in an area of the Pacific comparable in size to the continental United States.” Upon consideration of the senator’s position, Defense Department official Siddharth Mohandas agreed, insisting that the United States maintains “unfettered access” and “exclusive access” to the compact states’ exclusive economic zones.27
These interpretations of U.S. powers are inconsistent with international law. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (U.N. L.O.S.C.), which establishes the rights and duties of countries in exclusive economic zones, makes it clear that exclusive economic zones cannot be used for the purposes of strategic denial. Articles 58 and 87 of the convention grant all countries the freedoms of navigation and overflight in exclusive economic zones. In other words, third parties, including their military forces, can pass through the exclusive economic zones of the compact states. When U.S. officials insist that they can deny third parties access to the area, they are shunning international law.
Currently, 169 countries are parties to the U.N. convention. Although the United States has never ratified the convention, many officials claim to support it.28 A standard position in Washington is that the United States abides by the terms of the treaty.29 “We’ve effectively lived by the terms of the treaty, even as a nonparty and a holdout,” John Kerry observed in 2012, when he was secretary of state in the Obama administration.30 In December 2022, State Department official Monica Medina hailed the convention as “a monumental achievement in the field of international law.” After noting that “much of the convention reflects customary international law,” she emphasized “our steadfast commitment to upholding the rights, freedoms, and obligations of all UN member states as reflected in the convention.”31
In fact, U.S. officials have long known of the limits to strategic denial. More than two decades ago, the U.S. General Accounting Office (G.A.O.) issued a major report in which it explained that both the compacts and international law limit strategic denial to the 12-mile nautical waters around the islands of the compact states. The basic reason, the G.A.O. explained, is that the compacts limit the geography of the compact states to their territorial seas and the space above them. Since the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea identifies a 12-nautical mile limit to territorial seas, the G.A.O. reasoned, strategic denial can only apply to the compact states’ 12-mile territorial waters. “Statements by policymakers that indicate the United States has a right to deny military access to the islands and a vast area of the Pacific Ocean—a widely cited U.S. interest—overstate the breadth of this right, which only covers the individual islands and their 12-mile territorial waters,” the G.A.O. concluded.32
Another indication of the limits of U.S. powers comes from U.S. practices. Across the world, the United States conducts military operations with the stated purpose of keeping the exclusive economic zones of other countries open to navigation and overflight. When the U.S. military sends warships through the South and East China Seas, for example, military officials say they are maintaining freedom of navigation and defending the rights of countries to operate wherever international law allows. “If left unchallenged, excessive maritime claims could limit the rights and freedoms enjoyed by every nation,” Defense Department officials explained in 2022.33
Efforts by countries such as China and North Korea to deny foreign military forces access to their exclusive economic zones are regularly met with opposition from the United States. The U.S. position is that coastal states such as China and North Korea “do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs,” the Congressional Research Service reports. “The United States will continue to operate its military ships in the EEZs of other countries.”34
Indeed, U.S. officials are highly critical of countries that try to deny access to areas that are open to international operations. They have been especially critical of China, accusing it of creating anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that can exclude U.S. military forces from areas along its coastline. “It is no secret that the PRC’s military strategy is predicated in part on trying to prevent the United States… from projecting power into the region and being able to maintain it,” Defense Department official Ely Ratner explained in 2023. Expressing particular concern about China’s A2/AD capabilities, Ratner said that “we have to be very clear-eyed about PRC’s attempts.”35
When U.S. officials claim to have a right of strategic denial over the compact states’ exclusive economic zones, they are flaunting the very principles that they require other countries to follow. Essentially, they are claiming to have their own A2/AD capabilities in the compact states. Any attempt by the United States to enforce strategic denial in the compact states’ exclusive economic zones would be a violation of international law. Indeed, there is no legal basis for the United States to maintain its large oceanic empire, a fact that has been clear since the G.A.O. published its pivotal report more than twenty years ago.
Oceanic Empire in Perpetuity
As U.S. officials have tried to carve out an exception to their understanding of international law as it applies to the exclusive economic zones of the compact states, they have made another audacious move. With the goal of maintaining U.S. empire in perpetuity, they have sought to make their special military controls permanent. Both the defense veto and strategic denial authority, they claim, exist forever. Indeed, officials in Washington insist that the United States possesses a permanent right to establish military bases in the compact states and a permanent right to exclude third parties from their lands, waters, and airspace. As Defense Department official Siddharth Mohandas told Congress in 2022, “those rights exist in perpetuity.”36
To justify these claims, U.S. officials cite the compacts’ provisions that grant the United States military controls over the islands. Unlike economic assistance, U.S. officials say, the military provisions never expire and cannot be renegotiated. When Yun summarized the compacts at an event in 2023, he articulated this way of thinking when he described the military provisions of the compacts as “perpetual.”37
What is perhaps most extraordinary, however, is the claim that the United States can maintain its military controls even if the compact states withdraw from the compacts. From this perspective, the United States can maintain its military controls forever. In 1989, Arnold Leibowitz made the case for the permanence of U.S. military controls in Defining Status, his comprehensive legal analysis of U.S. relations with U.S. colonies and the compact states. Defense arrangements with the compact states, he argued, “provide for a U.S. defense umbrella during the life of free association and indefinite exclusion of third-country military forces even if any FAS opts for independence.” The reason for this permanent power, Leibowitz claimed, is that the compacts can be terminated only through mutual agreement. If the United States refuses to agree to terminate the compacts, he argued, then the military provisions cannot expire.38
Officials in Washington have been careful about publicly touting Leibowitz’s interpretation of the military provisions but do sometimes indicate that they share the same understanding. During a congressional hearing in 2023, former U.S. compact negotiator Albert Short made it a point to assert that the United States can maintain its strategic denial authority forever, even if a particular compact state withdraws from its compact. “We have that right, even if the compact is terminated,” Short insisted. “It’s a unilateral right on the part of the United States to continue or to terminate.”39
Ultimately, U.S. claims to permanence undermine the very notion that the compact states are sovereign states, just as U.S. officials insist they are. If the United States maintains the powers of strategic denial and the defense veto in perpetuity, regardless of what the people of the compact states say, then the compact states are little more than U.S. colonies. If left unchallenged, these powers will leave the United States in a position to maintain its oceanic empire forever.
Conclusion
When U.S. officials discuss their strategy for the Indo-Pacific, they emphasize goals that they believe will resonate with the region’s peoples. They talk about the need for economic growth and development. They emphasize the importance of addressing climate change. They insist upon maintaining a region that is free and open. The Indo-Pacific, U.S. officials say, must have freedom of navigation and be part of a rules-based international order. “Our mission,” President Biden said in 2023, “is to advance our vision of a free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.”40
Officials in Washington often make these points to suggest that they are working to counter China, a country they portray as a threat to the region and a rules-based international order. China, they say, is a revisionist power that is seeking regional and global hegemony. Its leaders are trying to create what one U.S. official has called “a Chinese empire in the sea.”41 A constant refrain in Washington is that China is trying to close off entire areas of the Pacific Ocean to the United States and its allies. “We are going to hold China accountable to follow the rules… whether it relates to the South China Sea or the North China Sea, or their agreement made on Taiwan, or a whole range of other things,” President Biden said in 2021.42
What U.S. officials omit from their talking points, however, is the fact that their own imperial structures are impediments to a rules-based international order. In the compact states, it is the United States that has created an empire in the sea. There is no freedom of navigation in the compact states, only a system of U.S. controls that undermines the very notion of a rules-based international order. In fact, the U.S. oceanic empire violates the very sovereignty of the compact states, which have never fully obtained their independence; according to some U.S. interpretations, the compact states will never be independent.
As long as U.S. officials insist upon maintaining an oceanic empire in the central Pacific Ocean, their actions and policies will remain a threat to the region, as their approach leaves the compact states in a state of underdevelopment, susceptible to the growing dangers of climate change. U.S. insistence upon wielding the powers of strategic denial and the defense veto may even lead to confrontation with China. “We have fought for these strategic islands before,” U.S. Representative Brad Sherman acknowledged in 2023, referring to U.S. battles with Japan over the Pacific Islands during World War II. “Now we are fighting again, hopefully in a non-lethal battle, and we need to pay attention.”43
Whether or not anyone is paying attention, officials in Washington are continuing with their imperial management of the region. Hoping to lock in their own version of A2/AD, they are trying to maintain U.S. controls over the compact states forever. Even as they repeatedly condemn China and other countries for making comparable efforts elsewhere, U.S. officials show no signs of changing their approach. The leaders of the United States remain dedicated to the task of maintaining a large, illegal, and permanent oceanic empire, all with little concern about the implications for the international system or the consequences for the people of the compact states.
Footnotes:
1: This essay builds on an earlier article published by Foreign Policy in Focus. See Edward Hunt, “U.S. Claims to Central Pacific Flout International Law,” Foreign Policy in Focus, September 18, 2023, https://fpif.org/u-s-claims-to-central-pacific-flout-international-law/.
2: U.S. House Committee on Natural Resources, The Biden Administration’s Proposed Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2023, 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 18, 2023, https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=414550.
3: Edward Hunt, “Compact Colonialism: U.S. Neocolonialism in Micronesia in the Early Twenty-First Century,” Postcolonial Studies, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2023.2261705.
4: Thomas Lum, The Freely Associated States and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 7, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R46573.
5: U.S. House Committee on Natural Resources, The Biden Administration’s Proposed Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2023.
6: Joseph Yun and Patrick M. Cronin, “Special Envoy Yun on US Engagement in the Pacific,” April 28, 2023, https://www.hudson.org/events/special-envoy-yun-us-engagement-pacific.
7: Hunt, “Compact Colonialism.”
8: U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Pacific Island PermReps Lay Out Concerns on State of U.S. Partnership, Climate Change, Development Aid,” 09USUNNEWYORK247, March 11, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USUNNEWYORK247_a.html.
9: U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Ambassador Rice Meets with Palau PR Beck,” 09USUNNEWYORK1013, November 12, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USUNNEWYORK1013_a.html.
10: Edward Hunt, “The United States Still Holds Back on a Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific,” The Progressive, August 18, 2022, https://progressive.org/latest/united-states-holds-back-nuclear-treaty-hunt-081822/.
11: U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, The Freely Associated States, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., March 29, 2022, https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2022/3/full-committee-hearing-on-the-freely-associated-states.
12: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Compacts of Free Association: Populations in U.S. Areas Have Grown, with Varying Reported Effects, GAO-20-491, June 2020, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-491.
13: Yun and Cronin, “Special Envoy Yun on US Engagement in the Pacific.”
14: Frank Whitman, “Panuelo: FSM Seeks Continued Close Ties with US; Peaceful, Unified Pacific,” Pacific Island Times, September 30, 2022, https://www.pacificislandtimes.com/post/panuelo-fsm-seeks-continued-close-ties-with-us-peaceful-unified-pacific.
15: Antony J. Blinken et al., “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and President of the Republic of the Marshall Islands David Kabua, President of the Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo, and President of Palau Surangel Whipps Jr. Before Their Meeting,” September 29, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-president-of-the-republic-of-the-marshall-islands-david-kabua-president-of-the-federated-states-of-micronesia-david-panuelo-and-president-of-palau-surangel-whipps-jr/.
16: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Compacts of Free Association: Populations.
17: Susanne Rust, “How the U.S. Betrayed the Marshall Islands, Kindling the Next Nuclear Disaster,” Los Angeles Times, November 10, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/projects/marshall-islands-nuclear-testing-sea-level-rise/.
18: Ben Doherty, “Australia Signs Declaration Saying Climate Change ‘single greatest threat’ to Pacific,” Guardian, September 6, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/06/australia-signs-declaration-climate-change-greatest-threat-pacific-islands.
19: U.S. House Committee on Natural Resources, The Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2023, 118th Cong., 1st sess., October 19, 2023, https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=414959.
20: David Brunnstrom and Michael Martina, “Exclusive: US Negotiator Signs New Deal with Strategic Marshall Islands,” Reuters, October 16, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-negotiator-expects-sign-new-deal-with-strategic-marshall-islands-monday-2023-10-16/.
21: U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, The Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2023, 118th Cong., 1st sess., July 13, 2023, https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2023/7/hearing-to-receive-testimony-regarding-the-compact-of-free-association-amendments-act-of-2023.
22: John T. Hennessey-Niland, “US Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands: Risk of Over-Promising and Under-Delivering,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, February 9, 2023, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/02/09/u-s-diplomacy-and-the-pacific-islands-risk-of-over-promising-and-under-delivering/.
23: Brad Lendon and Simone McCarthy, “While China Makes Pacific Islands Tour, US Coast Guard Is Already on Patrol,” CNN, June 2, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/02/asia/us-coast-guard-pacific-islands-china-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.
24: Yun and Cronin, “Special Envoy Yun on US Engagement in the Pacific.”
25: “Rep. Porter, Sens. Hirono and Markey Spearhead Effort to Formally Apologize for U.S. Nuclear Legacy in the Marshall Islands,” March 1, 2022, https://porter.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=440.
26: Rose Gottemoeller, “A Current Security Imperative: The US Role in the Marshall Islands,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 22, 2022, https://thebulletin.org/2022/05/a-current-security-imperative-the-us-role-in-the-marshall-islands/.
27: U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, The Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2023.
28: Henry Kissinger et al., “Time to Join The Law of the Sea Treaty,” Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2012, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303674004577434770851478912.
29: Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Living Resources Provisions, Congressional Research Service, October 4, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R47744.
30: John Kerry, “Law of the Sea: A National Security Issue That Unites,” Huffington Post, June 14, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-kerry/a-national-security-issue_b_1596414.html.
31: Monica Medina, “Assistant Secretary Monica Medina Remarks: The Constitution of the Sea,” December 8, 2022, https://www.state.gov/assistant-secretary-monica-medina-remarks-un-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-40th-anniversary/.
32: U.S. General Accounting Office, Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U.S. Defense Interest in Two Micronesian Nations, GAO-02-119, January 2002, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-02-119.
33: “DoD Releases Fiscal Year 2022 Freedom of Navigation Report,” April 21, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3370607/dod-releases-fiscal-year-2022-freedom-of-navigation-report/.
34: Ronald O’Rourke, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, November 15, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R42784.
35: Ely Ratner, “Dr. Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Indo-Pacific Security Affairs), Participates in Defense Writers Group Discussion,” December 5, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3608805/dr-ely-ratner-assistant-secretary-of-defense-indo-pacific-security-affairs-part/.
36: U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, The Freely Associated States.
37: Yun and Cronin, “Special Envoy Yun on US Engagement in the Pacific.”
38: Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989).
39: U.S. House Committee on Natural Resources, How the Compacts of Free Association Support U.S. Interests and Counter the PRC’s Influence, 118th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 2023, https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=413428.
40: Anthony Albanese et al., “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, Prime Minister Modi, and Prime Minister Albanese at the Third In-Person Quad Leaders’ Summit,” May 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/05/20/remarks-by-president-biden-prime-minister-kishida-prime-minister-modi-and-prime-minister-albanese-at-the-third-in-person-quad-leaders-summit/.
41: Michael R. Pompeo, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo With David Rubenstein of Bloomberg News,” January 5, 2021, https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-david-rubenstein-of-bloomberg-news/.
42: Joseph Biden, “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference,” March 25, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/03/25/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference/.
43: U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Renewed U.S. Engagement in the Pacific: Assessing the Importance of the Pacific Islands, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 2023, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/renewed-u-s-engagement-in-the-pacific-assessing-the-importance-of-the-pacific-islands/.
Edward Hunt writes about war and empire. He has a PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary.
