This article first appeared in the SiC Report “Rethinking Insecurity in the Blue Pacific Region.“ Click here to access the introduction and a full PDF download of the Report.
By Marco de Jong
Introduction
New Zealand’s new coalition government has signalled a heightened interest in involving New Zealand in AUKUS: a security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The likely costs and obligations involved in AUKUS association make this a generational foreign policy decision that could largely determine New Zealand’s approach to increasing geostrategic competition in the Pacific region.
This article examines government communications and declassified documents the author has obtained through New Zealand’s Official Information Act, placing these against the paradigms Pacific Island Countries have outlined for their own security. It argues that New Zealand involvement in AUKUS Pillar Two would undermine a previous commitment to an independent, nuclear free, and Pacific-led foreign policy. My contention is that this approach is not in New Zealand’s interests.
AUKUS and Pillar Two
Announced in September 2021, AUKUS is a trilateral security pact involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Its objective is to extend nuclear deterrence, integrate military industrial bases, and develop disruptive technology to maintain United States’ military primacy and contain Chinese influence.
AUKUS comprises two pillars. AUKUS “Pillar One” centres around the Australian acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. AUKUS “Pillar Two,” involves developing advanced military technology and increasing interoperability between combat forces.
Together, AUKUS’ two pillars are central to its member nations’ overarching “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and approach to strategic competition with China. By tightening their political and economic ties, and organizing them around military power projection in the “Indo-Pacific,” AUKUS nations seek to deny China’s influence and maintain a favorable geopolitical order. They envisage continued dominance ‘across [potential] warfighting domains,’ be that air, land, sea, space or cyber, and the full ‘spectrum of conflict’, from diplomatic or trade disputes, through proxy or “gray zone” operations, into conventional and even nuclear war.1 This effort is based on theories of ‘integrated deterrence’ and represents a total approach to warfare preparedness.2
The focus of this article, AUKUS Pillar Two, aims to develop technological advantage and “win” the next generation arms race that is being shaped by new autonomous weapons platforms, electronic warfare systems, and hypersonic missiles. Also known as ‘Advanced Capabilities’, Pillar Two has gained increased prominence as analysts emphasise the ‘game-changing’ potential of such technologies and China’s ‘commanding lead’ in research towards them.3 AUKUS nations intend to open Pillar Two to “like-minded” nations inclined to be Japan, Canada, South Korea and New Zealand. At the time of writing, Japan’s involvement in Pillar Two is being formally considered, and will likely proceed on a project-by-project basis. New Zealand’s status is less clear with involvement contingent on invitation and subsequent consideration by cabinet ministers.
Toward New Zealand Involvement
New Zealand’s prospective involvement in AUKUS Pillar Two forms part of a broader, renewed alignment with the Anglosphere. New Zealand has followed Australia in adopting “Indo-Pacific” framings to describe a ‘deteriorating strategic environment.’4 Declassified documents reiterate that New Zealand ‘shares the same assessment of the geostrategic outlook as the AUKUS partners,’ with ‘shared interests in peace, stability, economic prosperity, and multilateralism underpinned by the US’ ability to maintain influence and efficacy as a global superpower.’5 This alignment is frequently couched as supporting “the international rules based order” or a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, and translated to regional contexts as ‘ensuring a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific’ or ‘peaceful, stable, prosperous and resilient Pacific.’6
To meet this assessment of the geopolitical landscape, New Zealand has recently reviewed its security architecture to reconfigure the ways its defence and diplomacy operate. A series of reports released in mid-2023 by Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Intelligence Community emphasized hard security, making the case for reorienting the military from being low-tech, dual civilian purpose, and NZ realm-focused, to being high-tech, combat-ready, and expeditionary.7 These reports emphasised ‘a rising and more assertive China’ as necessitating increased interoperability with AUKUS powers in service of regional stability,8 This assessment faced criticism as New Zealand faces no direct military threat from its largest trading partner and continues to operate in a comparatively benign strategic environment.9
New Zealand officials disclosed a ‘willingness to explore’ involvement in AUKUS Pillar Two in March 2023.10 Ministers then directed officials to consider what AUKUS Pillar Two ‘might offer or mean for New Zealand, on a no commitments basis.’11 Membership was further discussed during the visits of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in July, where the latter stressed the ‘door is very much open for New Zealand’ to join.12 Internal debates within the Labour Party, reportedly between Defence Minister Andrew Little and Minister of Foreign Affairs Nanaia Mahuta, indicated that no decision was made before parliament rose in late August.13 Significantly, written parliamentary questions and OIA requests reveal Mahuta did not meet with any foreign representatives or receive any written advice on AUKUS during this time, whereas Little received multiple briefings, including one detailing ‘opportunities for New Zealand’s research community and industry’.14 Officials continued to meet on AUKUS, notably in September when a joint agency delegation met with United States National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, in Washington, and in November, where a similar meeting took place in Canberra.15
Following the general election of October 2023, New Zealand’s new coalition government has moved quickly to service relationships with AUKUS powers. Incoming Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters and Defence Minister Judith Collins have used the rhetoric of ‘stepping up’ and ‘pulling our weight’ in service of strategic objectives New Zealand shares with so-called “traditional partners.”16 They have followed this commitment with the deployment of NZDF personnel to support US-UK led strikes on Houthi rebels in Yemen and participation in the inaugural ANZMIN talks of February 2024 (a two-by-two bilateral between Australia and New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Defence ministers). Here, Collins spoke openly about the coalition’s ‘[interest] in being involved in Pillar Two’, adding, ‘it's not a secret.’17
Until ANZMIN, discussions about New Zealand's potential involvement in AUKUS were driven by a small group of ministers and unelected officials. Due to national security and diplomatic sensitivities, public understanding of Pillar Two remained poor and reliant on government communications that highlighted the transfer of unspecified “non-nuclear,” “advanced technologies.”18 However, during 2024, AUKUS has generated political controversy in New Zealand to an extent that foreign policy issues rarely do. While not the focus of this article, domestic opposition to AUKUS centres around an apparent lack of public debate and Pillar Two’s implications for New Zealand’s “bipartisan,” “nuclear free” and “independent” approach to foreign policy.
On bipartisanship, it is important to note that while the formerly governing New Zealand Labour Party began talks on AUKUS Pillar Two, support was mixed with leader Chris Hipkins suggesting his “preference [was] for some other arrangement” going into the 2023 election.19 Neither major party campaigned on involvement and support primarily reflects the pre-election positions of the two minor coalition parties, one of which, New Zealand First, is led by Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters.20 Opponents have argued that the coalition’s enthusiasm suggests an in-principle decision has been made to involve New Zealand in Pillar Two without a political mandate, with former Prime Minister Helen Clark warning of a "profoundly undemocratic" shift in New Zealand's foreign policy.21 At the time of writing, the Labour Party has seemingly firmed a position against AUKUS involvement, citing the detrimental effect formal association would have on New Zealand’s diplomatic agency and non-adversarial, trading relationship with China.22 While opposition to AUKUS does not fall along party lines, this growing political disconnect has serious implications for New Zealand’s “bipartisan” approach to foreign policy.23
AUKUS Pillar Two has been described as “non-nuclear,” and New Zealand’s potential involvement has been emphasised as consistent with the 1987 Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act and international legal commitments under the Treaty of Rarotonga (see below). Declassified documents show that “non-nuclear” messaging was formulated in March 2023 and updated in November 2023.24 It centres pre-emptive talking points stressing New Zealand’s close geostrategic alignment and longstanding cooperation with AUKUS powers, alongside their robust nuclear safeguards and commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and international law. Significant questions remain around the specificities of Pillar Two, however, and whether it ought to be framed as “non-nuclear” or as a standalone technology sharing arrangement, given the advanced capabilities are interdependent with Pillar One’s submarines, and integrated with nuclear command, control and communications infrastructure.25 Such considerations have played into broader debates around Pillar Two’s relevance to New Zealand given the technologies’ likely cost and lack of regulation, with some questioning whether they could otherwise be readily obtained bilaterally or through Five Eyes.26
Lastly, foreign policy circles have been debating the style and substance of New Zealand’s “independent” foreign policy. AUKUS opponents have suggested the pact could draw New Zealand into future conflicts or would prevent New Zealand from voicing principled difference from partners, as it has recently on issues such as a ceasefire in Gaza or the UNSC permanent members’ veto powers for example.27 In December, Peters responded to such criticism, claiming the policy is meaningless and that every nation that pursues its own interests acts “independently.”28 Elsewhere I have argued that while declassified documents endorse AUKUS as an initiative that bolsters the international rule of law and regional stability, and that therefore aligns with New Zealand’s interests, they neglect to explain how this is so. Moreover, such endorsements also neglect AUKUS’ ineffectiveness at addressing UN dysfunction, US exceptionalism, Russian expansionism, and Pacific instability, all of which threaten New Zealand's ability to act independently.
Ultimately, there has been a lack of transparency about the diplomatic assumptions guiding engagement with AUKUS powers. Public messaging has not acknowledged the broader significance of the pact with proponents downplaying the potential costs. Pillar Two involvement could damage trade with China, would likely involve reprioritising Pacific aid spend, and is risky given the possibility of another Trump presidency in America.29 Given AUKUS’ implications for New Zealand’s ability to work across east to west and north to south as it were, any AUKUS association could damage New Zealand’s standing with commonly interested partners in an emerging multipolar world order.
AUKUS, New Zealand, and the Pacific
Over the past year and as part of engagement towards AUKUS, New Zealand has sought to manage down its commitment to aspects of an independent, nuclear free, and Pacific-led foreign policy. This approach has been a mainstay of New Zealand’s diplomacy since the 1980s. It functions both as an expression of Aotearoa’s place in and of the Pacific and its success in hedging superpower competition to foster new relationships following suspension from ANZUS over its anti-nuclear policy. The following section shows how this longstanding approach broadly aligns with and amplifies regional conceptions of security, and how New Zealand involvement in AUKUS would thus represent a “retreat” from the Pacific into the Anglosphere.30
As it stands, AUKUS has three key implications for New Zealand and its Pacific engagement. The first is that it commits New Zealand’s closest ally, Australia, to US-led military competition with China. AUKUS has required Australia to reorient its political and economic establishment towards US integrated deterrence and to produce nuclear submarines. In turn, AUKUS has put pressure on New Zealand to follow its threat assessment of China and increase military spending towards interoperability. This has occurred, though not wholly or openly, with New Zealand ministers making oblique reference to “consistency” on China while adopting the coded language of alignment—most pointedly in the ANZMIN talks of February 2024, where they ‘discussed the AUKUS trilateral partnership and agreed it made a positive contribution toward maintaining peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific...’31
The move away from an “independent” foreign policy has quickened, despite the concern over the effect AUKUS has had on Australia’s sovereignty and its economy, Pacific opposition to militarisation, and the domestic instability AUKUS-related pacts have generated in several Pacific nations, namely Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.32 For their part, Pacific nations are concerned that superpower competition is pressuring them to “pick sides,” going against their long-held mantra of “friends to all, enemies to none.”33 They have offered what is known as the “China alternative” believing Pacific people can exclude superpower competition without being “pro-authoritarian,” “naïve,” or “victims.”34
The second implication is that AUKUS sets a nuclear proliferation precedent, by exploiting loopholes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Rarotonga. Australia, a non-nuclear weapons state, is set to receive highly enriched (weapons-grade) fissile material through AUKUS Pillar One and host nuclear-capable bombers and submarines under Pillar Two. Given the close defence relationship and overall level of interoperability between ANZAC forces this has implications for New Zealand’s own non-nuclear security.
In the Pacific, nuclear issues are closely tied to aspirations for regional self-determination. In a region living with the legacies of nuclear testing in Marshall Islands, Ma’ohi Nui, and Kiribati, there is concern that AUKUS, along with the Fukushima discharge, has ushered in a new nuclearism. Australia has sought endorsements to offset regional concerns about AUKUS, notably at the 52nd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting and the ANZMIN talks. However, it is clear AUKUS has had a chilling effect on Australia’s support for nuclear disarmament, with Anthony Albanese appearing to withdraw Australian support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and the universalisation of Rarotonga.35 New Zealand, which is a firm supporter of both these agreements, must consider that while Pillar Two has been described as “non-nuclear,” it is unlikely that Pacific people find this distinction meaningful, especially if it means stepping back from such advocacy. This scepticism is also understandable given AUKUS operates a doctrine of nuclear warfighting, and that advanced technologies under AUKUS Pillar Two are integrated with the operation of nuclear-powered submarines and will likely modernise nuclear arsenals.36
The third is that AUKUS has shifted how its member nations engage the Pacific region, with a greater emphasis on security. The Indo-Pacific Strategy gives AUKUS both its operational demands and a geographic focus. In the Pacific, the need to secure market and military access has driven diplomatic engagement, with AUKUS prompting a series of bilateral economic partnerships and security arrangements. Some of these arrangements – including the Papua New Guinea-United States Defence Cooperation Agreement and Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union for example – have been criticised for being opaque and one-sided, based on seeming zero-sum or sphere-of-influence logic symptomatic of an imperial mindset.37 For Pacific leaders, this heightened, securitised interest presents opportunities, typically for development assistance, but potentially at the expense of Pacific priorities and regional decision-making bodies like the Pacific Islands Forum.38 For New Zealand, this instrumental approach to aid and regionalism threatens to displace its Pacific-led engagement and source of influence. New Zealand has invested considerable resources and political capital into its “Pacific Reset” and “Resilience” frameworks. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nanaia Mahuta, explained how this ‘[enabled] New Zealand to do more,’ using a layered, whole of government approach that was ‘partner-led’ and ‘built in Indigenous traditional knowledge [and] gender equity opportunities’ to go ‘beyond [trade], hard security or defence arrangements’ and ‘support the aspirations of the Pacific as they exist.’39
Pacific nations are clear that climate change remains the ‘single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’ and that genuine security can only be achieved through climate action and people-centred development provided through Pacific-led “family first” regional architecture. They have called for a stop to the ‘militarisation of the Pacific’ and ‘a united ocean of peace’.40 This vision is clearly articulated in the Pacific Islands Forum’s Boe and Biketawa Declarations and the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and is fundamentally incompatible with AUKUS. Pacific people are quick to point out that Australia has committed upwards of A$368 billion to nuclear submarines through AUKUS but will not finance its transition away from fossil fuels, or fair share of climate finance and overseas aid, for example.
Conclusion
Taken together, Pacific opposition to AUKUS is based in the belief that its military focus and reliance on nuclear technologies go against Pacific peoples’ own conceptions of security. Because AUKUS powers have sought to integrate the Pacific regional security agenda into an Indo-Pacific Strategy, intentionally sidelining Pacific-led regionalism and its priorities, they are creating the very instability in Pacific societies they claim to address.
When I first wrote about AUKUS, I suggested that peoples of the Pacific must act in the full understanding that our ocean is becoming, once again, a sacrifice zone: a military buffer and climate disaster area.41 I said that hawks in Canberra, Washington and London have the intel, they see a Pacific region that is facing deepening disaster. But instead of committing to the alternative security vision held by Pacific nations, they have chosen securitised lenses that see the region in imperial terms and our people as collateral. This remains the case, giving Aotearoa a choice, between the Pacific and the Anglosphere.
Ultimately, any New Zealand involvement in AUKUS must be weighed against other interests and forms of international influence, but especially in the Pacific. This decision is about credibility on regional issues of climate, development, and disarmament. Without maintaining principled difference from major polluters and military powers, New Zealand could lose its standing in the Pacific, and by extension the world.
Footnotes
1: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf
4: NZ briefing to South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting, November 2023.
5: NZ briefing to New Zealand-United States Defence Policy Dialogue, October 2023; Document obtained under OIA entitled “BACKGROUND AND NEW ZEALAND MESSAGING”.
6: NZ Briefing to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting, September 2023.
7: MFAT Strategic Policy Assessment, “Navigating a shifting world: Te whakatere i tētahi ao hurihuri’, June 2023; DPMC, “Aotearoa's National Security Strategy: Secure Together Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki”, August 2023; MOD, “Defence Policy and Strategy Statement”, August 2023.
8: Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee, Oral Item: Defence Policy and Strategy Statement: Update, 27 June 2023.
10: It should be noted officials had identified areas for cooperation since October 2021.; MFAT, “AUKUS: Trilateral Enhanced Security Partnership – Implications for Aotearoa New Zealand”, October 2021.
11: MFAT, “AUKUS: Updating New Zealand’s Approach”, March 2023.
13: https://e-tangata.co.nz/comment-and-analysis/aukus-is-an-election-issue/.
14: WPQ 25693 (2023). Teanau Tuiono to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; WPQ 25694 (2023). Teanau Tuiono to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; MOD, “AUKUS Pillar Two: Opportunities for New Zealand's Research Community and Industry”, September 2023.
15: MOD, “BACKGROUND AND NEW ZEALAND MESSAGING”, November 2023.
16: Winston Peters, Keynote Address to the United States Business Summit, Auckland, 30 November 2023; https://newsroom.co.nz/2024/01/31/sparks-fly-over-red-sea-deployment/.
18: It is unclear what public consultation has been undertaken, or for example, if iwi Māori or Pasifika communities have been approached.
19: Chris Hipkins, said “My preference is for some other arrangement rather than being a part of AUKUS” during a leader’s debate on 29 September 2023.
20: In addition, Minister Collins expressed support for AUKUS in 2021 while leader of the opposition.
21: https://www.1news.co.nz/2024/04/09/helen-clark-warns-new-zealand-is-returning-to-anzus/
23: Luxon has consistently stressed “very good bipartisan alignment around foreign policy positions" https://www.politik.co.nz/peters-going-the-way-of-the-usa/.
24: MOD, “BACKGROUND AND NEW ZEALAND MESSAGING,” November 2023.
26: https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/514608/aukus-pillar-2-a-fragrant-methane-wrapped-bull-bob-carr .
28: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-diplomatic-corps-0.
29: https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/508280/chinese-embassy-deplores-opposes-australia-nz-joint-
statement#:~:text=China%20says%20the%20joint%20statement,and%20firmly%20oppose%22%20the%20statement.;
30: https://www.1news.co.nz/2024/02/02/foreign-policy-shift-to-aukus-may-be-seen-as-a-retreat-expert/.
31: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3242989/new-zealands-beijing-ties-remain-consistent-even-china-hawk-returns-foreign-minister; JOINT STATEMENT ON AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS (ANZMIN) 2024, 1 February 2024.
32: https://johnmenadue.com/aukus-signalling-a-concern-for-sovereignty; Hugh White, ‘Fatal Shores: AUKUS is a grave mistake’, Australia Foreign Affairs 20 (2024); Sam Roggeveen, The Echidna Strategy: Australia’s Search for Power and Peace (Victoria: La Trobe University Press, 2023)
34: Graeme Smith and Terence Wesley-Smith, eds, The China Alternative: Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands (Acton: ANU Press, 2021)
35: At PIFLM52 Albanese was reluctant to call on the United States to ratify the protocols to the SPNFZ, saying “I endorse the US as a sovereign nation that has the right to determine its own position. I don’t think it needs advice from me. We support the Treaty of Rarotonga. All of our activity is consistent with it.” https://icanw.org.au/wp-content/uploads/Troubled-Waters-nuclear-submarines-AUKUS-NPT-July-2022-final.pdf;
37: https://e-tangata.co.nz/comment-and-analysis/good-faith-lacking-in-australia-tuvalu-agreement/.
38: Anna Powles, ‘How Aotearoa New Zealand is Responding to Strategic Competition in the Pacific Islands Region’, Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs 9 (2023); https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/pacific-led-regionalism-undermined;
https://devpolicy.org/pbp-initiative-rides-roughshod-over-regional-processes-20220705/.
39: Nanaia Mahuta, speaking to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, 29 September 2022.
40: https://twitter.com/RRegenvanu/status/1731788761116070260; https://www.forumsec.org/2050strategy/.
41: https://e-tangata.co.nz/comment-and-analysis/resist-aukus-protect-hawaiki/.
Marco de Jong is a Pacific historian and lecturer in the AUT Law School.
