By Prisca Afantchao
Abstract: To some, the recent Israeli recognition of Somaliland, a breakaway region of northern Somalia may seem sudden. However, Somaliland’s need for external recognition from powers like Israel, and Israel’s interest in the Horn of Africa are not new issues. Early post-colonial relations in the Somali Republic were further complicated by the coercive and unequal pursuit of homogenization. Even though northern and southern leaders accepted the post-colonial borders, Somalilander leadership opted for secession after major grievances with a southern-centric establishment. Various governments have engaged with Somaliland but none were willing to challenge the African Union’s authority over African border integrity. Up until now the campaign for an independent Somaliland had not found a receptive audience. Contention over the recent Somaliland-Israel relations have been disruptive to African leaders across the continent and sparking questions of how to prevent imposition or exploitation of domestic turmoils.
On December 26, 2025, Israel became the first and only external power to recognize the region of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. While the move received condemnation from many global leaders, it should not have caught anyone by surprise. The move drew fierce condemnation from the African Union which has consistently resisted secessionist movements that threaten borders established at independence. The breakaway region’s quest for external recognition, and Israel’s interest in the Horn of Africa, are not new issues. Israeli representatives are characterizing the legitimization of Somaliland as a matter of affirming its right to self-determination, while some Somalilanders characterize “a quest for global recognition” as a shared goal (Husseini 2025). In reality, Israel’s interests are geopolitical and Israel has been working in close tandem with the United Arab Emirates to further its regional interests from Western Asia to the Horn of Africa. In response to the unfolding genocide in Gaza, Houthi rebels began a blockade of the Bab al Madeb Strait, limiting Israeli commercial and military access to the Red Sea. Somaliland’s location in northern Somalia is ideal for accessing the Red Sea, which Israel has already sought through increasing diplomatic, commercial, and military relations with Eritrea and Djibouti.
While there has been much focus on Israeli geopolitical interests, there is less attention paid to the history and reality of Somaliland. Knowledge of Somaliland has been obscured by its unofficial statehood and its position within Somalia, which many have branded as a failed state. Ultimately, the Somaliland government's choices present questions about post-colonial state legitimacy, the legacies of colonial and neo-colonial intervention, Arab Solidarity, and the future of the Red Sea.
Somaliland Origins
The Federal Republic of Somalia was formed through the merger of the current region of Somaliland, previously known as British Somaliland, and the Trust Territory of Somalia, formerly Italian Somaliland. Before their merger, both had been British Protectorates. As with the rest of Africa, colonial legacy continued to influence identity formation and governance long past official independence. Despite the merging of the two regions, the uneven spread of power in the early days proved fateful for decades to come. A major early power was the Somali Youth League, the first political party of the Somali Republic and political home of the first president of Somalia, favoring Mogadishu. While they all agreed upon joint independence and statehood, the initial consensus that allowed the formation of Somalia, early statehood was contested due to perceived preference for the Southern Somali elite, like the Hawiye. Clan-based discrimination escalated during General Siad Barre’s 1969 military coup and subsequent regime, which appointed members of his own clan (Prunier 1995). Leaders of the Somaliland National Movement, consisting of Northerner secessionists, then declared reversion to its pre-independence borders and began operating semi-independently from Somalia. Though the Act of Union was still respected by Somalia, Somaliland rejected it and became a de facto state (Hoch and Rudincová 2015).
As with other post-colonial states, the formation of national identity was in practice developed through a coercive and unequal homogenization. The ethnic minority of Bantu Somalis, descendants of those enslaved during the Arab Slave Trade, are considered closer to blackness and are marginalized. In Somalia, clans are based on shared patrilineal descent (Hersi 2018). Though people change affiliation “for protection, for marriage, for grazing and land rights,” they do not necessarily protect people from biases based on their class, occupation (Besteman 1996), or “phenotypic traits” such as “coarse or kinky hair” (Öke and Farah 2024) and other features. Somaliland specifically has a population of around 4 million people and mostly consists of the Isaaq clan. Primarily, upon unification, the flag, capitol, and head of state were all of southern origin and the north only had 33 of 123 National Assembly seats (Bade 556-557, 2024). Later, the Barre administration’s violence against the Isaaq clan perpetuated the rifts between north and south (Renders and Terlinded 2010).
The most direct roots of the present day northern and southern separation lie in the bloody history of Somali civil war, including violence against the Isaaq clan, from 1960 to 1991. During those years, the central government, headed by Siad Barre of the Marehan clan, responded to government opposition from northerners with violence. The rampant violence against the Isaaq lasted roughly between 1960 and 1991, subjecting the group to repeated mass killings in the cities of Hargeisa, Bur’o, and Berbara (Hoch and Rudincová 2015). Intentional, systematic, organized attacks included aerial bombardment, compromising water sources, and rape as a weapon of war (Samatar 2019). Many members of the Isaaq clan fled to Ethiopia. Others formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981, a northern based insurgent group with a goal of ousting Siad Barre from power. What is known as the First Somali Civil War started in 1988 and destabilized Barre’s military government. After three years of civil war, Somaliland declared independence in May of 1991 (Jhazbhay 2010).
Despite initial acceptance of the post-colonial borders, the Somalilander leadership separated for their own protection and self-defense. Secessionism was not necessarily the initial goal, but preferential treatment of the south and overwhelming violence against northerners is what sparked the overall separatist project. The drift towards de facto autonomy by Somaliland was not inevitable but resulted from the mix of southern domination and overwhelming violence against northerners. Today, many non-Isaaq (ex. Dhulbahante and Gadabiirsi) do not support secession. The Somaliland government is Isaaq-dominated and the Somaliland government’s establishment was most successful in Isaaq-majority parts of Somaliland (Mark-Thiesen 2022). Internal disagreement parallels the uneven treatment following the establishment of the unified Republic of Somalia.
Nevertheless, despite this history and the efforts of Somalilander elites, there was little headway made in gaining international legitimacy, until Israel’s official recognition of Somaliland’s statehood on December 26, 2025 (Ali 2025). Various governments have engaged with Somaliland but none were willing to challenge the African Union’s authority over African border integrity. Up until now the campaign for an independent Somaliland had not found a receptive audience.
Israel and UAE Geopolitical Interests
Recognition of Somaliland coincides with a moment in which Israeli, UAE, and US interests are keen on the Horn of Africa. The UAE has become widely known as one of the major outside actors in Africa, rivaling China in commercial investments and military activity. The UAE began more intentionally building its relationship with Somalia during the early days of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s presidency in an effort to quell political Islam during the Arab Spring (Yizezew 2026). Emirati dealings with Somaliland specifically escalated in January 2024 due to the government’s involvement with the Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum, which increased Ethiopian access to the Gulf of Aden via a naval base. Somali politicians claimed the UAE had a hand in facilitating the deal. Due to the UAE’s frequent interaction with Somaliland, and its close relations with Israel, especially via the Abraham Accords, Somalia cut all diplomatic ties with the UAE in January 2026. This action mirrors the UAE’s closure of Mogadishu outposts after Somalia did not cut ties with Qatar in 2018 (Mohamud 2025). Israel’s similarities with the UAE do not end with their strategic “carrot diplomacy” in Eritrea and Somaliland. The UAE is also enabling genocide in Sudan through its support of the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (Krieg 2025).
Israel, particularly post October 7, has sought to remake the entire region along lines that establish its hegemony in the Middle East. Given the close ties between the UAE and Israel, the recognition of Somaliland makes sense to Israel as a means to bypass the Bab el-Mandeb, as well as another foothold for Israeli influence. The involvement of Israel has extreme geopolitical implications, not only for the Horn of Africa but also Northern Africa and Western Asia. On the other side of Israel’s interest in Somaliland is the United Arab Emirates. Emirati investors have been particularly interested in developing African ports. The Emirati royal family-owned Dubai Ports World and Abu-Dhabi Ports Group are two major maritime presences contributing to the UAE’s status as one of the largest foreign investors in Africa. Emirati investments reached a stride decades ago via the Port of Djibouti, but lost favor with the government in 2018 as Djibouti developed more autonomous policies (Gbadamosi 2023). Somaliland’s strategic position at the coast of the Gulf of Aden is a highly attractive alternative to the Israeli, UAE, and U.S. governments. Sea routes from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal, as well as shipping routes along Somaliland’s coast, matter to governments of the region due to military and mercantile priorities.
As a means of confronting Israel after the Palestinian Nakba and the Arab-Israeli War, contention and military conflict over the Red Sea has persisted (Donelli 2025). The Israeli government, as it does elsewhere, continues to characterize its actions as beneficial to global security and commerce, not just its own self-interest. Israel has already attempted to create footholds in the Horn of Africa via its electronic intelligence base in Eritrea, which was established in 2016 to allow operatives to watch Bab al-Mandab. Disputes in the Red Sea increased after Eritrea gained independence in the 1990s post-9/11 and again following the 2023 Al Aqsa Flood Operation. Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly relied on capitalist rhetoric to denounce Houthi Rebel blockades in the Red Sea, claiming that "what is going on in the Red Sea is a threat to shipping in the entire world.” (Muss’id 2024).
When Israeli foreign minister Gideon Sa’ar was received by Somaliland President Abdullahi “Irro,” he applauded Somaliland for internal democracy and peace. Sa’ar claims the move for recognition is based on the right to self determination and long-term collaboration for stability in the region. Using the principle of self determination as a defense for this declaration only highlights the double standard of Sa’ar’s claim that Somaliland differs from Palestine because “Somaliland is a fully functioning country based on the principles of international law” (Berman 2026). Such claims about fitness and functionality compare to the European empires’ defenses for ownership of protectorates and colonies of the past. Though Somaliland leaders have taken action for their own self-interest, external hegemonic influence is fundamentally in the interest of Israel, not the people of Somaliland. Overall, as Professor Samar Al Bulushi has argued, Somaliland is “accepting a new form of subjugation” in place of partial autonomy under Somalia by fraternizing with Israel and other hegemons. Somalia itself has also gained a reputation among Western policymakers as a failed state due to its instability, yet these policymakers rarely recognize that the country’s instability has been shaped by decades of foreign intervention (Al-Bulushi 2026). If Somaliland officials want the country to avoid a similar fate, normalizing foreign intervention so early is imprudent. Israel and the UAE are joined by the United States in this regional imposition. The US right-wing’s Project 2025 even identifies “recognition of Somaliland statehood” as a goal (Reid 2025). With Djibouti President Guelleh accusing the UAE and Israel of infiltrating the Horn of Africa, distancing the country from US interests, some commentators believe that American foreign policy would benefit from deprioritizing Djibouti-USA relations and focusing on Somaliland (Ducharme 2025).
Turmoil over borders, clans amidst separatist groups can be manipulated by powers like Israel and the United Arab Emirates in many ways, making the African continent particularly open to their targets. When it benefits Israeli military strategy, Israel uses the pursuit of recognition to enable its trespasses into the struggles of de facto states like Somaliland. Due to Zionist fixation on creating “Greater Israel” beyond the land of Palestine, the extension of Israel’s presence likely will not stop at the Horn of Africa. Given that Israel is directly intervening in African affairs and potentially undermining the sovereignty of African states, the African Union and other regional countries may not consider a more direct response. It is undeniable that African international relations are interdependent with nations like the United States and the Gulf states. However, this major change in Somaliland’s sovereignty and regional relations proves it is imperative that the African Union and other African authorities set a new precedent of mediating territorial disputes amongst themselves. Leaving such longstanding issues unresolved.
Prisca Afantchao is a researcher with a concentration in Africa and the African Diaspora. She graduated from Hampshire College with a BA in International Relations and Philosophy. Her interests include combining critical philosophy of race with International Relations theory, and exploring the implications of humanitarian action on the African continent. Prisca began working with SIC as a volunteer and now acts as Researcher for the SIC African Affairs program.
