This article first appeared in the SiC Report “Rethinking Insecurity in the Blue Pacific Region.“ Click here to access the introduction and a full PDF download of the Report.
By William Waqavakatoga and Joanne Wallis
Abstract: In this paper we argue that greater regionalism is an important way for Pacific Island countries to respond to encroaching strategic competition, but we acknowledge the challenges that face these endeavours. We begin by identifying the Pacific’s security priorities and tracing how Pacific Island countries have used regional approaches to pursue them. We then attempt to define the region, noting that the ambiguous role of partner states can challenge regional solidarity. We then discuss the other major challenges to regionalism: sub-regionalism, bilateralism, parallel structures, and the changing context of Pacific regionalism.
Introduction
In their 2018 ‘Boe Declaration on Regional Security,’ Pacific Islands Forum leaders described their region’s geopolitics as ‘crowded and complex.’1 This statement reflected heightened interest in the region by, on the one hand, China, and, on the other hand, the United States and its allies and partners, particularly Australia, New Zealand, France, and Japan. The main response by Pacific leaders has been to strengthen regionalism, with the Forum ‘at the apex,’2 and united around the narrative of the ‘Blue Pacific.’3 Indeed, in the Boe Declaration these leaders endorsed the ‘‘Blue Pacific’ identity to drive collective action’ and committed to ‘strengthening the existing regional security architecture.’ The ‘2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent’ that Forum leaders adopted in 2022, emphasised their commitment to ensuring ‘that the Pacific Islands Forum and wider regional architecture is coherent and effective, and that they deliver on our collective strategic priorities.’4
On the surface, regional solidarity has been strong. For example, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited seven Pacific Island countries in April and May 2022 seeking agreement to a proposed regional economic and security pact with China,5 his efforts were rebuffed. Federated States of Micronesia president David Panuelo was quick to publicly reject the proposal.6 Ultimately, Samoan prime minister Fiamē Naomi Mata‘afa led the regional pushback, on the grounds that it was unreasonable for China to expect the pact to be rushed through, as ‘you cannot have regional agreement when the region hasn’t met to discuss it.’7 Although there was much discussion of Micronesian member states’ temporary withdrawal from the Forum in 2021, following controversy over the election of new Secretary General, all have since returned.
In this paper we argue that greater regionalism is an important way for Pacific Island countries to respond to encroaching strategic competition, but we acknowledge the challenges that face these endeavours. We begin by identifying the Pacific’s security priorities and tracing how Pacific Island countries have used regional approaches to pursue them. We then attempt to define the region, noting that the ambiguous role of partner states can challenge regional solidarity. We then discuss the other major challenges to regionalism: sub-regionalism, bilateralism, parallel structures, and the changing context of Pacific regionalism.
What are the Pacific’s security priorities and how has the region pursued them?
The Pacific Island region’s security priorities tend to be collectively categorised as non-traditional. Pacific Island countries’ security interests are not primarily framed in terms of state-centric traditional security concerns of extra-regional powers and concepts such as deterrence, containment, balance of power, or military strategy.8 In the Boe Declaration Pacific Island countries confirmed that they are interested in ‘an expanded concept of security inclusive of human security, humanitarian assistance, prioritising environmental security, and regional cooperation in building resilience to disasters and climate change.’ The declaration also reaffirmed that climate change is ‘the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific.’
While the Boe Declaration, and latterly the 2050 Strategy, have dominated contemporary discussions of security in the region, it is important to note that Pacific Island countries have long cooperated to respond to security challenges.
At the regional level, the oldest body is the Pacific Community (formerly South Pacific Commission, SPC), which was established by six colonial powers in 1947, but was not empowered to deal with political matters or questions of defence and security. Instead, the Commission desired ‘to encourage and strengthen international co-operation in promoting the economic and social welfare and advancements’9 of the colonised region. Today the Pacific Community ‘is the principal scientific and technical organisation supporting development.’10
The Pacific Islands Forum (formerly South Pacific Forum) was established to create opportunities for political discussions between leaders from independent and self-governing Pacific Island countries in 1971, including the agency to voice security concerns. Nuclear tests conducted by France were one of the most important external security issues raised at the first Forum meeting in Wellington in 1971. Participants ‘expressed their concern at the potential hazards that atmospheric tests pose to health and safety and to marine life which is a vital element in the Islands’ subsistence and economy and addressed an urgent appeal to the Government of France that the current test series should be the last in the Pacific area.’11 Despite security concerns and appeals, nuclear tests continued until the last in French Polynesia in 1996. The United Kingdom and the United States also conducted nuclear tests in the region. This meant that, ‘in the broader geopolitical context, the tests incorporated the Pacific peoples as reluctant participants in the realities of Cold War contestation.’12
As newly independent and self-governing states, securing marine resources and sovereign rights within their exclusive economic zones through the SPF ‘Declaration on the Law of the Sea’13 was of early regional importance before the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted. The ‘Tarawa Declaration’ made by Forum leaders in 1989 drew attention to UNCLOS provisions and noted the failure of distant-water fishing nations such as Japan and Taiwan ‘to respond to the concerns of regional countries’ on marine resources.
Beyond questions of control over maritime territory, Pacific Island countries’ security concerns were more inwardly focused during the 1980s. Conflict involving pro-independence movements (Kanaky and Bougainville), the two Fiji coups in 1987, climate change, and economic insecurity prompted the creation of Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) in 1990. According to Forum leaders, the FRSC was a regional response to the ‘international developments affecting regional security’ and represented their desire to collect and share intelligence for ‘the needs and priorities of member countries in the area of law enforcement cooperation.’14
The end of the Cold War changed how the region viewed security. The Declaration by Forum leaders on Law Enforcement Cooperation in 1991 was one area where the FRSC was tasked to ‘review and advise on programme priorities’ related to ‘regional and international security issues.’15 Forum leaders’ Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation in 1997 advanced a framing of security which recognised that the ‘most immediate risks to security in the region hinge on regional and domestic developments, including natural disasters, trans-national crime including drug trafficking, and economic, social and environmental policies.’16 The major threats to Pacific Island countries were seen as internal, with problems of law enforcement identified as one of the major issues.17 The need for an inward focus was continued with the Biketawa Declaration adopted by the Forum in 2000 as a ‘direct response’ to the May 2000 Fiji coup.18
The Framework for Pacific Regionalism (FPR) adopted by Forum leaders in 2014 expanded understandings of how security is managed by the region. The FPR was characterised as a ‘security strategic objective’ framework for ‘security that ensures stable and safe human, environmental and political conditions for all.’ FPR priorities had to ‘complement the national effort’ and ‘any encroachment on national sovereignty under the framework needs to be undertaken with the greatest caution.’ These priorities were identified through submissions by governments, civil societies, regional organisations, and other stakeholders to the Forum. Five priorities were identified and selected through submissions: fisheries, climate change, cervical cancer, information communication technologies, and West Papua. The latter has received the most interest.
While we have emphasised the importance of internal security challenges, we are cautious about the ‘blanket use of the term ‘non-traditional’ to describe security threats external to those directly generated by the conflicting interests of nation-states.’19 The term non-traditional ‘implies something new,’20 but many of the security challenges faced by Pacific Island countries, such as natural disasters, illegal fishing, smuggling, and climate changes, are longstanding, and Pacific Island countries have been collectively responding to them for decades, and individually and cooperatively responding for millennia. Therefore, we note that in the Pacific Islands region non-traditional security is best understood as ‘a specific way of looking at the world – a specific conception of how insecurity is created and the tools necessary to deal with it.’21 In contrast to Europe, Africa, and Asia, transnational conflict is not a feature and thus often lends credence to the myth that the Pacific Islands region is peaceful and passive. But, as we noted above, Pacific Island countries are not naïve about geopolitics and the impact that strategic competition may have on their region.
Defining the ‘Pacific Islands’ region
We use the collective description the ‘Pacific Islands region,’ and the simple answer to what constitutes that region is the membership of the Pacific Islands Forum: 14 island countries, two French territories, Australia, and New Zealand. But this definition excludes territories that are not members: American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Easter Island, Guam, Hawaii, Niue, Pitcairn Islands, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna. In addition, not all members are independent states: New Caledonia and French Polynesia are French territories, making France a de facto Forum member. Arguably the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, and the Republic of Marshall Islands also have constrained independence, as under their compacts of free association the United States has power over their defence and security. Non-Forum members are either territories of, or in free association with, the United States, France, New Zealand, or the United Kingdom.
Membership of the other major regional institution, the Pacific Community, illustrates many of these dynamics: 22 island states and territories, Australia, New Zealand, France, and the United States. There are also a range of other multilateral organisations, each with varying membership that reflects the influence of ‘history, identity, geographical proximity, more contemporary imperatives to combine resources to address issues, or on the strategic interests of either (or both) metropolitan or island states.’22
The question of whether metropolitan states – Australia, New Zealand, France, and the United States – are part of the region provides a significant challenge to Pacific regionalism. In 1971 Australia and New Zealand were included as members of the SFP because island leaders decided that their role might amplify the organisation’s international influence,23 although they had originally envisaged it being island-only.24 At times this decision has paid off, with Australia and New Zealand supporting Pacific Island countries’ positions during negotiations on UNCLOS, and more recently, efforts to fix the maritime boundaries in the face of climate change-induced rising sea levels.25 Similarly, they supported establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone via the 1986 Treaty of Rarotonga.26
But the latter case exemplifies the tensions that arise from differences between the foreign policy and strategic interests of Australia and New Zealand, and those of the island Forum members. This tension is evident in the case of Australia, which sees itself as a ‘middle power’ and seeks to play a role in the broader Indo-Pacific and internationally.27 During negotiations on the Treaty of Rarotonga, Australia had to balance its alliance with the United States, which opposed the treaty because Australian officials were concerned that it would constrain the US’s ability to operate nuclear armed vessels in the region, given the nation’s relationships with Pacific Island countries. Similar dynamics are evident today with respect to the AUKUS security partnership between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom in 2021.28 Pillar I of AUKUS is Australia’s development of nuclear-powered submarines with American and British assistance. Australia views these submarines as essential to its security and to fulfilling its obligations to the United States under the ANZUS treaty.29 This perspective has generated anxiety in several Pacific Islands countries. Shortly after the announcement, Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape commented that: ‘we have a very peaceful part of planet earth, we want to protect that peace and serenity... As far as securing peace is concerned, we’ve got no problem, but if such activities bring disharmony in the region then we have an issue.’30 In contrast, during a visit to Australia in March 2023, Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka said that he supported the AUKUS partnership.31 But regional concerns remain, and a review of the Treaty of Rarotonga was on the agenda for the 2023 Forum leaders’ meeting.
Differences between Australia and New Zealand’s interests, and those of island member states, have led to calls for Australia and New Zealand to either be removed from the Forum, or for other states to be added to dilute their influence.32 But untangling Australia and New Zealand from the Forum would be difficult, as both are major donors, which has long been perceived as a means to allow them to ‘dominate regional meetings.’33 While Forum members resolved in 2018 to move towards island member states providing 51 percent of contributions towards the Forum’s operating costs, Australia and New Zealand continue to provide the bulk of program costs. And the option of adding more large states as members is unlikely to be appealing to many island member states, since it will exacerbate existing power disparities. Indeed, the de facto presence of France as a Forum member, and to a lesser extent the US, has already affected power dynamics. Consequently, when US territory Guam proposed joining the Forum in October 2022, the proposal was met with skepticism by island member states. While Guam’s Lieutenant Governor Josh Tenorio said that his government had made the decision independently, there was concern about the United States’ influence behind the proposal. There was also concern that Guam’s membership could destabilise the Forum, and give the impression that the Forum was ‘being taken over by powers’.34
Indonesia points to five of its provinces which it characterizes as ethnically and linguistically Melanesian (Papua, West Papua, Maluku, North Maluku, and East Nusa Tenggara) to claim membership of the region.35 Although Indonesia became an associate member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group in 2015, there is scepticism about its claimed affinity with the region, which many see as primarily aimed at countering support for West Papuan independence.36
Divisions over the question of West Papua’s status highlight the limits of regional solidarity. The Forum has been weak in its support for West Papuan independence, as has the Melanesian Spearhead Group, which reflects domestic politics and Indonesia’s differing relationships with Pacific Island countries. While Forum leaders appointed Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka and Papua New Guinean Prime Minister James Marape as envoys to ‘facilitate a dialogue with Indonesia on areas of shared interest for mutual understanding’ in 2023,37 the deliberate vagueness of this language – which was accompanied by a reaffirmation of Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua – suggests little substantive progress on advancing West Papuan self-determination.
Finally, while for simplicity we refer to ‘Pacific Island countries,’ we acknowledge their diversity. They range in size from the culturally and linguistically homogeneous Niue, with a population of 1400 people to the comparably populous and linguistically diverse Papua New Guinea, with 8.7 million people. These nations also have differing sociopolitical systems and levels of economic development. They hold a range of different statuses, from sovereign states through to colonial entities, have differing formal relationships with metropolitan states, and complex diplomatic and historical relationships.38
Sub-regionalism
Another potential challenge to regional solidarity is the increasing relevance of sub-regions. Since independence, but particularly in the last decade, Pacific Island countries have identified with three geographical and cultural sub-regions: Melanesia (Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu); Micronesia (Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, and Republic of Marshall Islands); and Polynesia (American Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Hawaii, Niue, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna). Although these sub-regions are colonial constructs that reflect stereotypes about race and social evolution,39 they have crystallised and been instrumentalized by Pacific leaders. Melanesian states created the Melanesian Spearhead Group in 1988; Polynesian states formed the Polynesian Leaders Group in 2011; and Micronesian states initiated the Micronesian Presidents’ Summit in 1994 followed by the Micronesian Chief Executives Summit in 2003. The Melanesian Spearhead Group was institutionalized in 2007, has a secretariat in Port Vila, and its members have agreed to create a free-trade area, a skilled-labour-movement scheme, and a regional security strategy (although none of these initiatives have yet gained traction). Nauru is providing interim secretariat services for the Micronesian Presidents’ Summit as it seeks to formally establish a secretariat and develop shared foreign policy objectives.
The formation of these sub-regional groupings reflects two longstanding perceptions: first, that Polynesian countries dominate the regional agenda; and second, that Micronesian countries are marginalized in Pacific regionalism.40 The first perception arises partly because Polynesian countries have migration pathways to New Zealand, and therefore there is a comparatively large cohort of highly educated Polynesian regional officials, academics, and civil society leaders. In the 1990s the nomenclature ‘South Pacific’ was removed from many regional organisations, as it was perceived to exclude Micronesian countries.41
The controversy over the election of the new Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2021 was interpreted by some commentators as signalling the potential disintegration of the Forum.42 But its resolution could equally be read as supporting the Forum centrality. In June 2022, a group of Pacific leaders came together in Fiji and negotiated the Suva Agreement. That agreement stated that Micronesian countries would rejoin the Forum, with the following stipulations: Henry Puna step-down from the role of Secretary General at the end of his first term in 2024; that the leadership of the Forum would be rotated between the three sub-regions; that a new Forum office would be established in a Micronesian country; and that the position of Pacific Ocean Commissioner would be separated from the role of Forum Secretary General and moved to Micronesia. The agreement was endorsed by all Forum leaders, except those from Kiribati, at their meeting in July 2022. The absence of Kiribati was significant, as just days beforehand the Kiribati government had sent its formal letter of withdrawal to the Forum. Kiribati President Taneti Maamau justified this by arguing that the Forum had not sufficiently responded to Kiribati’s concerns and that Kiribati had not played a role in drafting the Suva Agreement. But there was scepticism about Maamau’s justification, particularly as his government has been winding back democratic freedoms, impinging on judicial independence, and drawing closer to China since it switched diplomatic recognition in 2019.
Yet in early 2023 Kiribati was brought back into the Forum. In January 2023 new Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka, then chair of the Forum, travelled to Kiribati to meet with Maamau. At a special Forum leaders’ meeting in February 2023, Kiribati’s re-entry to the Forum was confirmed and Kiribati endorsed the Suva Agreement. But while the Suva Agreement has defused anxieties about a fragmented Forum, there are concerns that it has entrenched sub-regional divisions within the Forum, particularly by institutionalising the sub-regional rotation of the Secretary General role.43 It also entrenched Australia and New Zealand’s role as the primary funders of the Forum, as they have agreed to finance the new initiatives.44
Bilateralism
Another challenge to Pacific regionalism is creeping bilateralism. Australia has been most active in this trend, signing a bilateral security treaty with Solomon Islands in 2017, a vuvale (friendship) treaty with Fiji in 2019, a comprehensive security and economic partnership with Papua New Guinea in 2020, a security agreement with Vanuatu in 2022, an economic and security focused memorandum of understanding with Kiribati in 2023, an economic and security focused bilateral partnership agreement with Samoa in 2023, the Falepili Union with Tuvalu in 2023, and a security agreement with Papua New Guinea in 2023 (diluted from the negotiations on a security ‘treaty’ the two states committed to in 2020.)45
The progress of the Australia-Papua New Guinea security agreement was delayed by Papua New Guinea entering into a defence cooperation agreement with the United States in May 2023. This agreement was controversial in Papua New Guinea, with students protesting and others expressing concern about the scope of access that the United States was being given.46 When the agreement was publicly released in June 2023 it was revealed that it granted ‘unimpeded access’ to United States personnel for ‘mutually agreed activities’ to a number of sea- and airports.47 The agreement also gave United States authorities ‘exclusive right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over US personnel,’ which may give rise to a legal challenge, as the constitutionality of immunities granted to Australian personnel in 2004 was successfully challenged in the Papua New Guinea Supreme Court in 2005. The scope of the agreement was consequently described as ‘unbelievable’ by Papua New Guinean academic Henry Ivarature, who said that it ‘reads to me as if PNG has sold itself and its sovereignty to the US.’48
During his 2022 tour of the region, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi did succeed in executing more than 50 bilateral development and security related agreements with the states he visited (both in person and virtually). His greatest victory was persuading Solomon Islands to sign a security agreement. Although the final agreement has not been made public (raising questions about democratic accountability), a leaked version was interpreted as opening the door to a potential Chinese military presence in Solomon Islands.49 Then Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare reassured Australia and other concerned metropolitan powers that this was not the case,50 but his government did invite greater policing assistance from China. The possibility also remains that Chinese troops could be invited to respond to instability, which would represent a seminal shift, as typically Australia or New Zealand lead invited stabilisation missions, generally with the approval of the Pacific Islands Forum. Yet concerns about this eventuating may be premature. Australia sent 100 additional Australian Federal Police (on top of the 50 already present) and 350 Australian Defence Force personnel to assist Solomon Islands with security when it hosted the November 2023 Pacific Games (alongside personnel from Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea). While this deployment was reportedly at the request of the Solomon Islands government, its size raised eyebrows among Pacific watchers, with one journalist quipping: ‘That’ll be about 1 ADF or AFP personnel for every 5 athletes.’51 Whether or not such a large deployment was necessary, it undoubtedly signalled that Australia remains Solomon Islands’ preferred security partner. However, the deployment did exemplify how metropolitan states’ concerns about the implications of the China-Solomon Islands security agreement have encouraged a bidding war to provide security assistance. This dynamic was also evident when China provided training to Solomon Islands police in late 2022. Australia then donated rifles and police vehicles. China responded with a donation of watercannons, motorbikes, and vehicles.52
Parallel structures
A related challenge to Pacific regionalism is the creation of parallel cooperative structures in, and for, the region. In 2022 the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the United Kingdom announced the ‘Partners in the Blue Pacific’ initiative with the aim of better coordinating their assistance to the region (Canada, Germany, and South Korea later joined). Pacific Island countries were only consulted about the initiative a few days before it was announced, and none were involved in the announcement (although several Pacific diplomats did attend). This oversight generated concerns that metropolitan states and other partners were co-opting the Blue Pacific narrative and sidelining regional mechanisms by states engaged in ‘displacing or competing with China.’53
While efforts have since been made for the Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative to engage with regional mechanisms, much more work remains. There is scope for Pacific Island countries to be more activist: in 2009 Forum leaders agreed to the ‘Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific’54 to improve donor coordination. While the Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative does not refer to the Compact, Forum leaders could push for all Partners in the Blue Pacific members to sign the Compact and then work through the Forum to coordinate their assistance. In addition, in 2018 the Forum created a Regional Development Partner Roundtable, which is linked to the Forum Economic Minister Meeting. There is again scope for Forum members to push for the Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative to work in consultation with that roundtable, or ideally, to subsume their coordination within the roundtable mechanism. Yet these conditions are unlikely to be attractive to the Partners in the Blue Pacific members, who have primarily created their grouping to marginalise China.
China has also sought to create parallel structures. In early 2023 China launched the China-Pacific Island Countries Disaster Management Cooperation Mechanism and the China-Pacific Island Countries Center for Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation. It has also proposed a China-Pacific Island Countries Sub-Center for Marine Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation.55 But while these initiatives purport to be region-wide, they only include the Pacific Island countries with which China has diplomatic relations, and therefore exclude Nauru, Republic of Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu.
Other partners also hold summits with Pacific Island countries. Japan has convened the Pacific Island Leaders Meeting (PALM) with Forum members every three years since 1997. In 2014 India initiated the first Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to Fiji. In 2023 he travelled to Papua New Guinea for the third summit. Notably, while Indian officials invited all the island member states of the Forum, it did not invite Australia or New Zealand. Similarly, when it convened the first United States-Pacific Island Country Summit in September 2022, the United States also did not invite Australia or New Zealand. Notably, when the United States convened a second summit in September 2023, it was renamed the United States-Pacific Island Forum Leaders’ Summit, and Australia and New Zealand were invited, perhaps signalling that the United States had heeded concerns that the first summit might have sidelined the Forum, as well as its ally Australia and close partner New Zealand. South Korea also convened the first Korea-Pacific Islands Summit in May 2023, inviting all Forum members.
The changing context of Pacific regionalism
Regionalism, like all diplomacy in the Pacific Islands region, depends on relationships, which are the ‘enduring currency of influence.’56 These relationships of ‘trust, respect, understanding and sincerity’57 have developed through decades of ‘Oceanic diplomacy’58 cultivated through opportunities for in-person conversations at regional and other meetings. This approach was well-illustrated by Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka’s ‘Pacific Way’ of diplomacy that drew on religion, personal background, and customary practices to encourage Kiribati to re-join the Forum in early 2023.59
But relationships between Pacific leaders are being tested by the changing context of regionalism. The necessity of closing borders during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic meant that regional meetings moved online, where many of the in-person conversations and diplomacy that had played a critical role in resolving regional differences in the past were not possible. This pressure arguably exacerbated the tensions that gave rise to the temporary split of the Micronesian member states from the Forum.
The foregrounding of the digital space during the pandemic highlighted the role of the internet. The availability of information, and the popularity of online discussions, particularly on platforms such as Facebook, have democratised Pacific regionalism, offering Pacific Islanders much greater opportunities to access information about, and comment on, regional activities. But these platforms have also put pressure on Pacific leaders and made it more difficult for them to engage in the ‘quiet conversations’ that had resolved differences in the past. Pacific regionalism therefore faces the challenge of adapting its analogue practices for a digital world.
Tensions between regional leaders were evident at the 2023 Forum leaders’ meeting. After Samoan Prime Minister Fiamē reportedly tabled questions about the process of selecting the next Forum Secretary General, former Nauruan President Baron Waqa, the Nauruan delegation walked out of the Forum plenary and did not participate in the leaders’ retreat.60 This contention highlighted both how the personal relationships that have been so critical to maintaining regional unity have been strained by several years of limited travel and interaction, and a growing trend of member states prioritising their national interests during regional discussions.
As we discuss above, the greater range of partner states seeking to be involved in Pacific regional organisations is also putting pressure on them. The Forum Dialogue Partners mechanism provides a way for partner states with significant interests in the region to engage in dialogue with Pacific Islands Forum leaders. Traditionally these dialogues take place immediately after the annual Forum leaders’ meeting. As the number of dialogue partners has increased (it is now 21), and the range of partner states seeking to be involved in the region has expanded, this dialogue mechanism has become more unwieldy – and contentious. For example, in 2018 the Chinese envoy to the Forum was said to have been ‘insolent’ and a ‘bully’ at the leaders’ meeting in Nauru, demanding to speak when it was not their turn.61 Indeed, recognising the potentially destabilising effect of partner states’ increased competition, Forum leaders opted not to hold the partners’ dialogue at their 2022 leaders’ meeting. That meeting was particularly sensitive as it was the first that Micronesian member states (except Kiribati) attended after agreeing to re-join the Forum. Growing resource and capacity constraints faced by most Pacific Island countries mean that metropolitan states, and other donors, are likely to play a role in security, development, and other assistance for the foreseeable future, suggesting an urgent need for Pacific Island countries to seek to manage how partner states operate in the region.
Fijian Prime Minister Rabuka has recently proposed a partial solution. At the August 2023 Melanesian Spearhead Group meeting, Rabuka called for the establishment of a ‘Zone of Peace.’62 During his October 2023 visit to Australia Rabuka fleshed out his proposal, saying that it would involve all major powers and Pacific Island countries agreement to refrain ‘from actions that may jeopardise regional order and stability’ as well as ‘maintaining respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.’63 While nascent, Forum leaders ‘welcomed’ the Zone of Peace concept in the communique from their 2023 meeting and mandated the Forum Secretariat with developing the concept in line with regional arrangements.64
Rabuka’s Zone of Peace proposal reflected an apparent desire to put a ‘personal stamp’ on how the region responds to geopolitical competition.65 It also reflected Rabuka’s age: he had been involved in politics at the time that an earlier iteration of a ‘zone of peace’ had been floated. In 1971 Sri Lanka had sought to create an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace to facilitate cooperation between the region’s newly decolonised states and to enshrine the principle of non-alignment in the region at the height of the Cold War. As in the Indian Ocean in the 1970s, a Zone of Peace in the Pacific Islands region is ‘fraught with complications’66 given the already extensive involvement of partner states we have described above. Indeed, the Zone of Peace concept exemplifies many of the challenges facing Pacific regionalism.
Conclusion
While Pacific leaders undoubtedly see greater Pacific regionalism as key to managing strategic competition and to pursuing their developmental, climate, and other goals, the complexities of determining membership, the influence of metropolitan states, and the difficulties of coalescing a regional consensus on contentious issues are likely to continue to challenge regionalism.
Footnotes:
1: Wallis, Joanne. "Crowded and Complex: The Changing Geopolitics of the South Pacific." Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 24 April 2017. https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/import/SR103_South-Pacific.pdf?VersionId=nRFKLRaA7Sk8eiUHEljRf6efYSho5QYo.
2: Pacific Islands Forum, 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2022), 7.
3: Ibid.
4: Ibid., 10.
5: Anna Powles, “Five things we learned about China’s ambitions for the Pacific from the leaked deal”, The Guardian, 26 May 2022.
6: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint press conference - Apia, Samoa (Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2022).
7: Daniel Hurst, “Samoa’s PM says China expectation of Pacific-wide deal ‘something we could not agree to”, The Guardian, 2 June 2022.
8: Herr, R. A. (2015). Regional Security Architecture in the Pacific Islands Region: Rummaging through the Blueprints. In Rouben Azizian & C. Cramer (Eds.), Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania (pp. 17-31). Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
9: Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission 1947 (Pacific Community).
10: Pacific Community, ‘Our Work’ (2023), https://www.spc.int/about-us/our-work.
11: South Pacific Forum Communique 1971 (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat).
12: Steven Ratuva, Contested Terrain (Canberra: ANU Press, 2019).
13: SPF Declaration on Law of the Sea 1976; 1977, Tarawa Declaration 1989 (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat).
14: SPF Communiques 1987; 1990 (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat).
15: Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement Cooperation [Honiara Declaration] 1992 (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat)
16: Aitutaki Declaration 1997 (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat).
17: Douglas Ranmuthugala, Security in the South Pacific – the law enforcement dimension (AFP Platypus Magazine, 2002).
18: Ratuva, Contested Terrain, 79.
19: James Goldrick, Let’s stop using the term ‘non-traditional’ about security threats (ASPI, June 2020).
20: Ibid.
21: Leanne J. Smyth, “Non-traditional security in the post-cold war era” (PhD diss., The University of British Columbia, 2013).
22: Wallis, Joanne, Henrietta McNeill, James Batley, and Anna Powles. "Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands: Architecture, Complex, Community, or Something Else?". International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 23, no. 2 (2023): 263-96. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac005. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac005.
23: Fry, Greg. "The Politics of South Pacific Regional Cooperation." In The South Pacific: Problems, Issues and Prospects, edited by Ramesh Thakur, 169-81. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991.
24: Ratuva, Contested Terrain.
25: Anna Naupa, Sealed with kava and betel nut: Lessons in Oceanic diplomacy from the Mota Lava Treaty. In Brief 2022/11, (Canberra: Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University).
26: South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 1985. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201445/volume-1445-I-24592-English.pdf.
27: Wallis, Joanne. "Is It Time for Australia to Adopt a “Free and Open” Middle-Power Foreign Policy?". Asia Policy 15, no. 4 (2020): 7-20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27023936.
28: Joint Leaders’ Statement on AUKUS, (The White House, 15 September 2021). https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/.
29: National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023, (Australian Department of Defence, 2023).
30: Whiting, Natalie. "On the #Aukus Deal and Nuclear Powered Subs for Australia,." X, 20 September 2021. https://twitter.com/Nat_Whiting/status/1439794797099687941?s=20.
31: Stephen Dziedzic, “Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka tells Anthony Albanese he backs AUKUS deal,” ABC News, 15 March 2023, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-15/fiji-pm-rabuka-tells-anthony-albanese-he-backs-aukus-deal-/102098028.
32: Campbell Cooney, “Fiji shuns Pacific Forum membership unless Australia and New Zealand are expelled,” ABC News, 29 April 2014, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-29/fiji-shuns-forum-membership/5418014.
33: Lawson, Stephanie. "Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands Forum: A Critical Review." Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 55, no. 2 (2017/04/03 2017): 214-35. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2017.1280205.
34: Marian Faa, “This island territory wants a seat at the Pacific’s ‘top table’. But who is pulling the strings?”, ABC News, 12 October 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-12/us-territory-guam-wants-to-join-pacific-islands-forum/101522642.
35: PNG Post Courier, “Indonesia commits to $20 million for capacity building in Melanesia”, PNG Post-Courier, 3 March 2015.
36: Waqavakatoga, William. "West Papua in the Changing Landscape of the New Pacific Diplomacy." The University of the South Pacific, 2021.
37: Pacific Islands Forum Communique 2023, (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2023).
38: Naupa, Anna. "Indo-Pacific Diplomacy: A View from the Pacific Islands." Politics & Policy 45, no. 5. (2017): 902-17. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12226.
39: Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius. "Re-Presenting Melanesia: Ignoble Savages and Melanesian Alter-Natives." The Contemporary Pacific 27, no. 1 (2015): 110-45. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24809815.
40: Gallen, S. Lowe. "Micronesian Sub-Regional Diplomacy." In The New Pacific Diplomacy, edited by Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, 175-88: ANU Press, 2015.
41: Herr, Regional security architecture in the Pacific Islands region.
42: Paskal, Cleo. "How the Pacific Islands Forum Fell Apart." The Diplomat, February 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/how-the-pacific-islands-forum-fell-apart/.
43: Sen, Sadhana, and Stephen Howes. "To the (Micronesian) Victors Go the Spoils." DevPolicy, 3 March 2023. https://devpolicy.org/to-the-micronesian-victors-go-the-spoils-20230303/.
44: Pacific Islands Forum Special Leaders Retreat 2023, (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2023).
45: Government of Papua New Guinea and Commonwealth of Australia, Papua New Guinea-Australia Comprehensive Strategic and Economic Partnership, 5 August 2020, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/papua-new-guinea-australia-comprehensive-strategic-and-economic-partnership-signed.pdf.
46: Hawkins, Koroi. "Concerns in Papua New Guinea over Framing of Us Security Pact." Radio New Zealand, 17 May 2023 https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/489999/concerns-in-papua-new-guinea-over-framing-of-us-security-pact.
47: Swanston, Tim, and Prianka Srinivasan. "US Military Granted Unimpeded Access to Key Papua New Guinea Defence Facilities in New Security Agreement." ABC News, 14 Jun 2023. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-06-14/us-military-granted-unimpeded-access-to-key-png-facilities/102480288.
48: Ibid.
49: Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius. "China-Solomon Islands Security Agreement and Competition for Influence in Oceania." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (2 December 2022). https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/12/02/china-solomon-islands-security-agreement-and-competition-for-influence-in-oceania/.
50: Mavono, Lice, and Kate Lyons. "Solomon Islands PM Rules out China Military Base and Says Australia Is ‘Security Partner of Choice’." The Guardian, 14 July 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/14/solomon-islands-pm-rules-out-chinese-military-base-china-australia-security-partner-manasseh-sogavare.
51: Sas, Nick. "That’ll Be About 1 ADF or AFP Personnel for Every 5 Athletes…." X, 12 November 2023. https://twitter.com/Sasbites/status/1723596126581031104.
52: Dziedzic, Stephen, and Evan Wasuka. "China to Gift Water Cannon Trucks, Vehicles to Solomon Islands Police Days after Australian Donation." ABC News, 4 November 2022. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-04/china-to-gift-solomon-islands-police-tucks-vehicles/101614464.
53: Fry, Greg, Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, and Terence Wesley-Smith. "‘Partners in the Blue Pacific’ Initiative Rides Roughshod over Established Regional Processes." DevPolicy, 5 July 2022. https://devpolicy.org/pbp-initiative-rides-roughshod-over-regional-processes-20220705/.
54: "Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific." (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2009). https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/cairns-compact-on-strengthening-development-coordination-in-the-pacific.
55: Joanne Wallis and Anna Powles, Smooth Sailing: How Australia, New Zealand and the United States partner in-and with-the Pacific Islands, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023.
56: Futaiasi, Derek, Priestley Habru, Maima Koro, William Waqavakatoga, and Henrietta McNeill. "Lalaga, Tithiki, Talia Vata: Pacific Islands Weaving Statecraft." Stretton Institute (University of Adelaide), February 2023. https://www.adelaide.edu.au/stretton/ua/media/683/ua30631-stretton-centre-paper-3-digital_0.pdf.
57: Waqavakatoga, William. "How the ‘Pacific Way’ of Diplomacy Shored up the PIF." East Asia Forum, 2023. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/07/how-the-pacific-way-of-diplomacy-shored-up-the-pif/.
58: Carter, Salā George, Greg Fry, and Gordon Nanau. "Oceanic Diplomacy: An Introduction." Dept. of Pacific Affairs, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University, 31 August 2021. https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/247293.
59: Waqavakatoga, “How the ‘Pacific Way.’
60: Foon, Eleisha. "Old Wounds Reopened? Nauru Walks out over Baron Waqa Question at Pacific Islands Forum." Radio New Zealand, 9 November 2023. https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/502029/old-wounds-reopened-nauru-walks-out-over-baron-waqa-question-at-pacific-islands-forum.
61: Doherty, Ben, and Helen Davidson. "Chinese Envoy Walks out of Meeting after Row with Nauru President Amid 'Bullying' Claims." The Guardian, 5 September 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/05/chinese-envoy-walks-out-of-meeting-after-row-with-nauru-president-amid-bullying-claims.
62: Needham, Kirsty. "Fiji Leader Says Hopes China, Us Rivalry Will Not Lead to Military Conflict." Reuters, 25 August 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/fiji-leader-says-hopes-china-us-rivalry-will-not-lead-military-conflict-2023-08-25/.
63: Dziedzic, Stephen. "Fiji PM Sitiveni Rabuka Calls for 'Zone of Peace' in the Pacific in Canberra Speech." ABC News, 17 Oct 2023. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-17/fiji-pm-sitiveni-rabuka-delivers-major-speech-in-canberra/102985840.
64: Pacific Islands Forum Communique 2023, (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2023)
65: Kaiku, Patrick, and Fath Hope Boie. "A Pacific “Zone of Peace” – What Will It Entail?", TheInterpreter 21 Nov 2023. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/pacific-zone-peace-what-will-it-entail#:~:text=Rabuka%20later%20clarified%20during%20a,idea%20in%20their%20own%20region.
66: Ibid.
William Waqavakatoga is a PhD candidate and Joanne Wallis is Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Adelaide.
